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Abstract
This paper presents new constructions of models of Hume’s Principle and Basic Law V
with restricted amounts of comprehension. The techniques used in these constructions
are drawn from hyperarithmetic theory and the model theory of fields, and formalizing
these techniques within various subsystems of second-order Peano arithmetic allows one
to put upper and lower bounds on the interpretability strength of these theories and hence
to compare these theories to the canonical subsystems of second-order arithmetic. The
main results of this paper are: (i) there is a consistent extension of the hypearithmetic
fragment of Basic Law V which interprets the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order
Peano arithmetic (cf. Corollary 54 and Figure 2), and (ii) the hyperarithmetic fragment
of Hume’s Principle does not interpret the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order
Peano arithmetic (cf. Corollary 92 and Figure 2), so that in this specific sense there is
no predicative version of Frege’s Theorem.
Keywords: Second-order arithmetic, Basic Law V, Hume’s Principle, hyperarithmetic,
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1. Introduction, Definitions, and Overview of Main Results
1.1. Introduction
Second-order Peano arithmetic and its subsystems have been studied for many decades
by mathematical logicians (cf. [35]), and the resulting theory continues to be the subject
of current research and a source of open problems. More recently, philosophers of math-
ematics have begun to study systems closely related to second-order Peano arithmetic
(cf. [8]). One of these systems, namely, Hume’s Principle, constitutes an axiomatization
of cardinality which is similar to the notion of cardinality defined in Zermelo-Frankel
set theory. The contemporary philosophical interest in this principle stems from Crispin
Wright’s suggestion that it can serve as the centerpiece of a revitalized version of Frege’s
logicism (cf. [43], [44], [25]). Frege himself focused his logicism around a principle called
Basic Law V, which in effect codified an alternative conception of set. While Russell’s
paradox shows that Basic Law V is inconsistent with the unrestricted comprehension
schema (cf. Proposition 4), this principle has garnered renewed attention due to Ferreira
and Wehmeier’s recent proof that it is consistent with the hyperarithmetic comprehension
schema ([13], cf. [41, 42] and Remark 52).
The goal of this paper is to apply methods from the subsystems of second-order Peano
arithmetic to the subsystems of Basic Law V and Hume’s Principle. In particular, we
use methods from hyperarithmetic theory to build models of subsystems of Basic Law V
(§ 3), and we use recursively saturated models and ideas from the model theory of fields
to build models of subsystems of Hume’s Principle and Basic Law V (§ 4). Our primary
application of these new constructions is to compare the interpretability strength of the
subsystems of second-order Peano arithmetic to the subsystems of Basic Law V and
Hume’s Principle. For, one of the few known ways to show that one theory is of strictly
greater interpretability strength than another theory is to show that the first proves the
consistency of the second (cf. Proposition 7). Hence, by formalizing our constructions,
we can compare the interpretability strength of subsystems of Hume’s Principle and
Basic Law V to subsystems of Peano arithmetic. Our main results about interpretability
are summarized in § 1.5 and on Figure 2. Prior to summarizing these results, we first
present formal definitions of the theories and subsystems of Hume’s Principle and Basic
Law V (§§ 1.2-1.4) and then describe what is and is not known about the provability
relation among these subsystems (§ 1.4 and Figure 1).
1.2. Definition of the Signatures and Theories of PA2, BL2 and HP2
The signature of PA2 is a many-sorted signature, with sorts for numbers as well as
a sort for sets of numbers. The theory PA2 is a natural set of axioms for the following
many-sorted structure in this signature:
(ω, 0, s,+,×,≤, P (ω)) (1)
This structure satisfies the eight-axioms of Robinson’s Q
(Q1) sx 6= 0 (Q2) sx = sy → x = y (Q3) x 6= 0→ ∃ w x = sw
(Q4) x+ 0 = x (Q5) x+ sy = s(x+ y) (Q6) x · 0 = 0
(Q7) x · sy = x · y + x (Q8) x ≤ y ↔ ∃ z x+ z = y
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and the mathematical induction axiom
∀ F [F (0) & ∀ n F (n)→ F (s(n))]→ [∀ n F (n)] (2)
and each instance of the comprehension schema (where F does not occur free in ϕ)
∃ F ∀ n [F (n)↔ ϕ(n)] (3)
Here, the formula ϕ is allowed to contain free object variables (in addition to n) and
free set variables (with the exception of F ). Hence, what an instance of this compre-
hension schema says is that if ϕ(n) is a formula with parameters, then there is a set F
corresponding to it. This all in place, we are now in a position to define:
Definition 1. The theory PA2 or CA2 or second-order Peano arithmetic consists of Q1-Q8,
the mathematical induction axiom (2), and each instance of the comprehension schema (3)
(cf. [35] p. 4).
The name CA2 is also given to PA2 because it reminds us of comprehension.
The signature of HP2 and BL2 is likewise a many-sorted signature, with sorts for objects
as well as sorts for n-ary relations on objects, and with an additional function symbol
from the unary relation sort to the object sort. The unary relations are written as
A,B,C, F,G,H,X, Y, Z and will be called sets , and the n-ary relation symbols for n > 1
are written as f, g, h, P,Q,R, S and will be called relations. Occasionally when we want
to say something about both sets and relations, we will talk about all n-ary relations for
n ≥ 1. The additional function symbol is denoted by # in the case of HP2 and by ∂ in the
case of BL2. So the signatures of HP2 and BL2 are exactly the same: it is merely for the
sake of convenience and clarity that we use # in the context of HP2 and ∂ in the context
of BL2. Hence, structures in this signature have the form
(M,S1, S2, . . . ,#) (4)
where M is a set, Sn ⊆ P (Mn) and # : S1 → M . Note that the function # only goes
from S1 to M , so that the relations from Sn for n > 1 are not in the domain of this
function.
It is worth pausing for a moment to dwell on a technical point. Formally, the signature
of PA2 also contains a binary relation symbol E which holds between an object and a set
and which, in the standard model from (1), is interpreted by the ∈ relation from the
ambient set-theory. In structures where this holds, let us say that the symbol E is
interpreted absolutely. It is easy to see that every structure in the signature of PA2 is
isomorphic to a structure that interprets this symbol absolutely, and it is for this reason
that this symbol is typically suppressed when describing structures. Likewise, formally
the signature of HP2 and BL2 contains (n+1)-ary relation symbols En, which hold between
n-tuples of objects and n-ary relations. Further, there is an obvious generalization of the
notion of absoluteness for structures in this signature, such that the structure from (4)
interprets En absolutely, and such that every structure in this signature is isomorphic to
a structure which interprets En absolutely. Hence, as in the case of second-order Peano
arithmetic, in what follows, these symbols will be suppressed when describing structures,
and it will be assumed that every structure in this signature has the form of (4).
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Hume’s Principle and Basic Law V can now be defined. Hume’s Principle is the
following axiom in the signature of structure (4):
#X = #Y ⇐⇒ ∃ bijection f : X → Y (5)
Here, the notion of bijectivity is defined in terms of functionality, injectivity, and surjec-
tivity in the obvious manner. The axiom Basic Law V is the following sentence in this
signature:
∂X = ∂Y ⇐⇒ X = Y (6)
Here, two sets are said to be equal if they are coextensive; formally, the equality of
coextensive sets can be taken to be an axiom of all the theories considered in this paper.
The important thing to note here is that (M,S1, S2, . . . , ∂) is a model of Basic Law V if
and only if the function ∂ : S1 →M is an injection. That is, Basic Law V mandates that
a very simple relation holds between S1 and M . There is no analogue of this in the case
of Hume’s Principle, since the right-hand side of (5) contains a higher-order quantifier.
Nevertheless, there are many natural models of Hume’s Principle, and examining
these models is the easiest way to define the theories HP2 and BL2. In particular, if α is an
ordinal which is not a cardinal, and if # is interpreted as cardinality, then the following
structure is a model of Hume’s Principle:
(α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#) (7)
Restricting attention to ordinals α that are not cardinals serves the purpose of ensuring
that #(α) < α, so that dom(#α) is P (α) and so that rng(#α) is a subset of α. For all
n-ary relation variables R and all n ≥ 1, this structure also satisfies each instance of the
following comprehension schema (where R does not occur free in ϕ(z))
∃ R ∀ n [n ∈ R↔ ϕ(n)] (8)
This comprehension schema is simply the generalization of the comprehension schema
from PA2, namely (3), to the n-ary relations for all n ≥ 1. Here, as with (3), the formula
ϕ is allowed to include free object variables (in addition to n) and free relation variables
of any arity m ≥ 1 (with the exception of R). Hence, we can now define the following
theories:
Definition 2. The theory HP2 is the theory that is given by Hume’s Principle (5) and
the comprehension schema (8).
Definition 3. The theory BL2 is the theory which is given by Basic Law V (6) and the
comprehension schema (8).
The primary focus of this paper is on subsystems of HP2 and BL2 that are generated by
restrictions on the complexity of the formulas appearing in the comprehension schema (8).
This is due to the fact that we seek to compare the interpretability strength of these
subsystems to those of second-order Peano arithmetic. However, unlike in the case of PA2
and HP2, attention must be restricted to these subsystems in the case of BL2. For, it is
not difficult to see that Russell’s paradox shows that BL2 is inconsistent:
Proposition 4. BL2 is inconsistent.
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Proof. By applying the comprehension schema (8) to the formula
ϕ(x) ≡ ∃ Y ∂(Y ) = x & x /∈ Y (9)
it follows that BL2 proves that there is set X that satisfies
∀ x [x ∈ X ⇐⇒ (∃ Y ∂(Y ) = x & x /∈ Y )] (10)
There are then two cases: either ∂(X) ∈ X or ∂(X) /∈ X. Case one: suppose that
∂(X) ∈ X. Then by the left-to-right direction of equation (10), it follows that there is Y
such that ∂(Y ) = ∂(X) and ∂(X) /∈ Y . But ∂(Y ) = ∂(X) and Basic Law V imply that
Y = X, so that ∂(X) /∈ X, which contradicts our case assumption. Case two: suppose
that ∂(X) /∈ X. Then by the right-to-left direction of equation (10), it follows that for
any Y we have that ∂(Y ) = ∂(X) implies ∂(X) /∈ Y . But then ∂(X) = ∂(X) implies
∂(X) /∈ X, which contradicts our case assumption.
Hence BL2 is inconsistent and does not have any models, unlike the theories PA2 and HP2,
which respectively have the canonical models (1) and (7).
1.3. Definition of the Subsystems of PA2, BL2 and HP2
So if one wants to study Basic Law V, one needs to pass to subsystems of Basic Law V
that do not allow instances of the comprehension schema (8) applied to formulas like the
one in (9). To this end, let us introduce the following natural hierarchy of formulas in
the signature of BL2 and HP2. A formula ϕ, perhaps with free object variables z and free
relation variables R of different arities m ≥ 1, is called arithmetical or Π10 or Σ10 if it does
not contain any bound m-ary relation variables for any m ≥ 1. Further, if m ≥ 1 and R
is an m-ary relation variable and ϕ(R) is a Σ1n-formula, then ∃ R ϕ(R) is a Σ1n-formula
and ∀ R ϕ(R) is a Π1n+1-formula. Likewise, if m ≥ 1 and R is an m-ary relation variable
and ϕ(R) is Π1n-formula, then ∃ R ϕ(R) is a Σ1n+1-formula and ∀ R ϕ(R) is a Π1n-formula.
That is, in this hierarchy of formulas, one is allowed to accumulate arbitrarily many
existential relation quantifiers of different arities m ≥ 1 in front of a Σ1n-formula and still
remain Σ1n, and likewise one is allowed to accumulate arbitrarily many universal relation
quantifiers of different arities m ≥ 1 in front of a Π1n-formula and still remain Π1n. It is
only the change from a universal relation quantifier of some arity m ≥ 1 to an existential
relation quantifier of some arity m ≥ 1 (or vice-versa) which increases the complexity of
the sentence in this hierarchy. For instance, if X is set variable and R and S are binary
relation variables, then the following formulas are respectively Σ11,Π
1
1,Σ
1
2,Π
1
2:
∃ X ∀ x R(x,#X) (11)
∀ R ∀ X ∃ y [∀ x R(x, y)→ y = ∂X] (12)
∃ X ∀ R [∃ x R(x, x)→ R(#X,#X)] (13)
∀ R ∃ X ∃ S ∀ y [(∀ x x ∈ X ↔ ¬Sxy)→ R(∂X, y)] (14)
Finally, it is worth explicitly noting that not all formulas are included in our hierarchy
of formulas. For instance, we have said nothing about the complexity of formulas which
include alternations of object quantifiers and set quantifiers, such as the following formula:
∀ X ∃ y ∀ Z [R(#X,#Z)→ R(y,#Z)] (15)
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However, this is not a serious omission, since so long as one includes enough of the
comprehension schema (8) to guarantee the existence of the singleton set {n} for each
element n, the above formula is equivalent to the following Π13-formula
∀ X ∃ Y ∀ Z [∃ y ∈ Y & ∀ z ∈ Y z = y] & [R(#X,#Z)→ R(y,#Z)] (16)
That is, we can correct for this omission by treating object quantifiers as set quantifiers
over singleton sets when they occur in alternation of object quantifiers and set quantifiers.
Using this hierarchy of formulas, one can define the subsystems of BL2 and HP2 by
restricting the complexity of formulas which appear in the comprehension schema (8).
For the following definition, let us recall that CA2 is another name for PA2 (cf. Definition 1).
The idea behind the following definition is then that AC reminds us of the axiom of choice
and is the result of inverting the letters in CA, which reminds us of comprehension. So
with the exception of the choice schema, each of the schemas which figure in the below
definition asserts the existence of a certain class of definable sets and relations:
Definition 5. Suppose that XY2 is one of CA2, BL2, or HP2. Then we can define the
following four subsystems of XY2:
(i) The subsystem AXY0 is XY
2 but with the comprehension scheme (8) restricted to arith-
metical formulas.
(ii) The subsystem ∆11 − XY0 is XY2 but with the comprehension scheme (8) replaced by
the following schema, which is called the ∆11-comprehension schema or hyperarithmetic
comprehension schema, wherein ϕ is a Σ11-formula and ψ is a Π
1
1-formula:
[∀ n ϕ(n)↔ ψ(n)]→ [∃ R ∀ n n ∈ R↔ ϕ(n)] (17)
(iii) The subsystem Σ11 − YX0 is AXY0 and the following schema, which is called the Σ11-
choice schema, wherein ϕ is a Σ11-formula:
[∀ n ∃ P ϕ(n, P )]→ [∃ R ∀ n ∀ P (∀ m (m ∈ P ↔ nm ∈ R))→ ϕ(n, P )] (18)
(iv) The subsystem Π1n − XY0 is XY2 but with the comprehension schema (8) restricted to
Π1n-formulas.
Further, in all these schemata, ϕ and ψ are allowed to contain free object variables
(in addition to n) and free relation variables of any arity m ≥ 1 (with the exception of
R).
The intuition behind the choice schema (18) can be made clearer as follows. Suppose
that a structure (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#) is a model of Σ
1
1 − PH0 and that the antecedent of a
given instance of the Σ11-choice schema (18) holds. Then Σ
1
1 − PH0 asserts the existence of
a relation R, which for the sake of simplicity we can assume to be a binary relation. For
each object n in M , the following set is then guaranteed to exist in S1 by the arithmetic
comprehension schema (which is included in Σ11 − PH0):
Rn = {m : Rnm} (19)
So it follows that (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#) |= ϕ(n,Rn) for every n in M . Hence, in the situation
where for every n there is a choice of P such that ϕ(n, P ), the Σ11-choice schema asserts
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Figure 1: Provability Relation in Subsystems of BL2, PA2, and HP2
that there is a uniform way to make these choices, in that there is an R such that its
columns Rn satisfy ϕ(n,Rn) for each n.
Note, however, that the map (R, n) 7→ #(Rn) is not a function symbol in the signature
of HP2 or BL2. For instance, given a binary relation R, the comprehension schema (8)
restricted to arithmetical formulas does not in general guarantee the existence of the
binary relation
{(n,m) : #(Rn) = m} = {(n,m) : ∃ X (∀ x x ∈ X ↔ Rnx) & #X = m}
= {(n,m) : ∀ X (∀ x x ∈ X ↔ Rnx) → #X = m} (20)
For, as these definitions make evident, one will in general need the hyperarithmetic com-
prehension schema (17) in order to show that this relation exists (cf. Propositions 48-49).
This example underscores an important fact: intuitively simple relations expressible via
the maps # or ∂ may be quite complex when explicitly written out in terms of the
primitives of the signature. Since our interest in this paper is on restrictions of the com-
prehension schema, this fact will be particularly important to keep in mind throughout
this paper. (In § 5, we raise the question of what happens when one does include func-
tion symbols (R, n) 7→ #(Rn) in the signature, so that relations like the one defined in
equation (20) would count as arithmetical.)
1.4. Summary of Results about the Provability Relation
Our primary concern in this paper is with the interpretability relation between sub-
systems of PA2, HP2, and BL2, and we summarize our results in the next section (§ 1.5).
However, since provability implies interpretability, and since the provability relation is in-
trinsically interesting, in this section we record what is known about this relation among
the subsystems of PA2, HP2, and BL2. This is summarized in Figure 1, where the double
arrows indicate that the provability implication is irreversible, and where the negated
arrows indicate that the provability implication fails, and where the arrows with question
marks beside them indicate that the provability implication is unknown.
Each of the positive provability relations in in Figure 1 follows immediately from the
definitions, except for the fact that Π11 − CA0 proves Σ11 − AC0 and the fact that Σ11-choice
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implies ∆11-comprehension. For the former, see Simpson [35] Theorem V.8.3 pp. 205-206.
For the latter, the proof from Simpson [35] Theorem VII.6.6 (i) p. 295 carries over to the
setting of HP2 and BL2, as we verify now:
Proposition 6. Σ11 − AC0 → ∆11 − CA0, and Σ11 − PH0 → ∆11 − HP0, and Σ11 − LB0 → ∆11 − BL0
Proof. Let M = (M,S, . . .) be a model of Σ11 − AC0 (resp. Σ11 − PH0, Σ11 − LB0). By
standard conventions,M is non-empty. However, nothing in these standard conventions
requires that M be non-empty as opposed to say S. But, in the case of Σ11 − AC0 we
have that 0 ∈ M , and in the case of Σ11 − PH0 we have that #∅ ∈ M , and likewise in
the case of Σ11 − LB0 we have that ∂∅ ∈ M . Hence, for the remainder of the proof, fix
parameter a ∈ M . Suppose that M |= ∀ z ϕ(z) ↔ ψ(z), where ϕ is Σ11 and ψ is
Π11. Then M |= ∀ z ϕ(z) ∨ ¬ψ(z). Then by the arithmetical comprehension schema,
M |= ∀ z ∃ Z (ϕ(z) ∧ a ∈ Z) ∨ (¬ψ(z) ∧ a /∈ Z). By the Σ11-Choice Schema, there is R
such that
M |= ∀ z ∀ Z (∀x x ∈ Z ↔ Rzx)→ [(ϕ(z) ∧ a ∈ Z) ∨ (¬ψ(z) ∧ a /∈ Z)] (21)
By the arithmetical comprehension schema, there is W such that z ∈ W if and only if
Rza. Then we claim that z ∈ W if and only if ϕ(z). For, suppose that z ∈ W , so that
Rza. Then Z = {x : Rzx} exists by the arithmetical comprehension schema, and we
have a ∈ Z. Then by (21), it follows that ϕ(z). Conversely, suppose that z /∈ W , so that
¬Rza. Then Z = {x : Rzx} exists by the arithmetical comprehension schema, and we
have a /∈ Z. Then by (21), it follows that ¬ψ(z) and hence ¬ϕ(z). Hence, in fact we
have established that z ∈ W if and only if ϕ(z). So M models ∆11 − CA0 (resp. ∆11 − HP0,
∆11 − BL0).
The known non-provability relations in Figure 1 are not difficult to verify. In the case
of the subsystems of HP2, we can read these results off of the results for the subsystems
of PA2, as the proof of Proposition 46 indicates. In the case of the subsystems of BL2,
the only known result we have is that ABL0 does not prove ∆
1
1 − BL0, and this is shown
in Proposition 44. In § 5, we list the remaining unknown questions about the provability
relation, namely, the question of whether ∆11 − BL0 implies Σ11 − LB0 and whether Π11 − HP0
implies Σ11 − PH0.
1.5. Summary of Results about the Interpretability Relation
Most of the formal work done on the the subsystems of PA2, HP2, BL2 has concerned
the interpretability strength of these theories. A theory T0 is interpretable in a theory T1
(T0 ≤I T1) if every model M1 of T1 uniformly defines without parameters some model M0
of T0, where “uniform” has the sense that e.g. a binary relation symbol R in the signature
of T0 is defined by one and the same formula ϕ(x, y) in each model M1 of T1. (For a
more syntactic definition, see Lindstro¨m [23] p. 96 or Ha´jek and Pudla´k [17] pp. 148-149).
Since this relation is reflexive and transitive, one can define the associated notions
T0 ≡I T1 ⇐⇒ T0 ≤I T1 & T1 ≤I T0 (22)
T0 <I T1 ⇐⇒ T0 ≤I T1 & T1 I T0 (23)
The relation ≤I is then a partial order on the set of equivalence classes of theories under
the equivalence relation ≡I. Since this partial order is in fact a linear order in many
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natural cases, it can be intuitively conceived as a measure of the strength of the theory.
This order is also connected to the formal notion of consistency strength by the following
proposition:
Proposition 7. Suppose T1 is a finitely axiomatizable theory such that ACA0 ⊆ T1 ⊆ PA2,
and suppose that T0 is a computable theory in a computable signature. Then
T1 ` Con(T0) =⇒ T1 I T0 (24)
[T0 ≤I T1 & T1 ` Con(T0)] =⇒ T0 <I T1 (25)
Proof. (Sketch) For (24), note that if T1 ` Con(T0), then T1 proves that there is a model
M0 of T0 (cf. Simpson [35] Theorem IV.3.3 p. 140). But if T1 ≤I T0 and T1 is finitely
axiomatizable, then this interpretation is due to a finite number of the axioms of T0.
Further, since T0 is computable, this can be accurately represented in T1, so that inside
T1 the model M0 of T0 defines a model M1 of T1, which likewise exists since the theory
inside which we are working (namely T1 itself) includes arithmetical comprehension. But
then T1 would prove Con(T1), which contradicts Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem.
(For a formal proof, see Lindstro¨m [23] Chapter 7 Corollary 1 p. 97). Note that (25)
follows immediately from (24) and definition (23).
In what follows, we will apply this proposition to T1 = ACA0 itself or T1 = Π
1
1 − CA0,
both of which are known to be finitely axiomatizable (cf. Simpson [35] Lemma VIII.1.5
pp. 311-312 and Lemma VI.1.1 pp. 217-218).
The major previous results on the interpretability strength of the subsystems of PA2,
HP2, BL2 can be described as follows. In the 19th Century, Frege in essence showed that
PA2 ≤I HP2 (cf. Frege [14], [4], Boolos and Heck [7]), and recently Heck ([21] p. 192) and
Linnebo ([24] p. 161) noted that Frege’s proofs in fact show that Π11 − CA0 ≤I Π11 − HP0
(cf. § 2.2, Corollary 21). Further, Boolos ([3]) showed that the converse holds (cf.
Corollary 23), so that one has Π11 − CA0 ≡I Π11 − HP0 (cf. Corollary 24). Heck ([20]) then
showed that ABL0 interprets Robinson’s Q, and Ganea and Visser ([16], [40]) independently
showed that the converse holds, so that ABL0 ≡I Q. Likewise, Burgess ([8]) showed that
AHP0 interprets Robinson’s Q. Finally, Ferreira and Wehmeier ([13]) showed that ∆
1
1 − BL0
is consistent and a slight modification of their proof shows that Σ11 − LB0 is consistent,
and inspection of this proof shows that Σ11 − LB0 <I Π11 − CA0. These previous results
and our new results are summarized in Figure 2, where the double arrows indicate that
the provability relation is irreversible, and where the single arrows indicate that the
provability relation may or may not be irreversible. That is, in the diagram T1 ⇒ T0
means T0 <I T1 and T1 → T0 means T0 ≤I T1.
Our new results establish upper and lower bounds on consistent subsystems of BL2
and HP2 by (i) finding new constructions of models of these theories, (ii) noting that the
constructions can be formalized in theories such as ACA0 and Π
1
1 − CA0, and (iii) applying
Proposition 7. Our first main new result, Theorem 53, is a construction of a modelM of
Σ11 − LB0 using ideas from higher recursion theory (cf. Sacks [33] Part A). This structure
M models a finite extension of Σ11 − LB0 called Σ11 − LB0 + Inf which interprets Σ11 − AC0.
Moreover, since this construction is formalizable in Π11 − CA0, we have that Proposition 7
implies that Σ11 − LB0 + Inf <I Π11 − CA0.
Our second set of results concerns new constructions of models of ∆11 − BL0 and
Σ11 − PH0 and ∆11 − HP0 + ¬Σ11 − PH0. These results are all based on a generalization of
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Figure 2: Interpretability Relation in Subsystems of BL2, PA2, and HP2
a theorem of Barwise-Schlipf and Ferreira-Wehmeier which allows us to built models of
these theories on top of various recursively saturated structures (cf. Theorem 63). In
particular, we show that if k is a countable recursively saturated o-minimal expansion of
a real-closed field, then then there is a function # : D(k)→ k, where D(kn) denotes the
definable subsets of kn, such that the structure
(k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) (26)
is a model of Σ11 − PH0. Moreover, we note that this construction can be formalized in
ACA0 for fields with ACA0-provable quantifier elimination, so that by Proposition 7, we
have Σ11 − PH0 <I ACA0 (cf. Corollary 92). Further, we show that if k is a saturated
algebraically closed field, then there is a there is a function # : D(k)→ k, where D(kn)
denotes the definable subsets of kn, such that the structure
(k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) (27)
is a model of ∆11 − HP0 + ¬Σ11 − PH0. Further, we can use this construction to answer
an open question of Linnebo (cf. Remark 74 and Proposition 76). However, we do
not presently know whether this construction can be formalized in ACA0, although we
have reduced it to the question of whether Ax’s Theorem can be formalized in ACA0 (cf.
Remark 71 and Question 104). Finally, we show that if k is a countable recursively
saturated separably closed field of finite imperfection degree, then there is a function
∂ : D(k)→ k, where D(kn) denotes the definable subsets of kn, such that the structure
(k,D(k), D(k2), . . . , ∂) (28)
is a model of ∆11 − BL0 (cf. Theorem 101). However, we do not presently know whether
this construction can be formalized in ACA0, although we have reduced this question to
the question of whether the proof of the elimination of imaginaries for separably closed
fields can be formalized in ACA0 (cf. Remark 102 and Question 105).
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2. Standard Models of HP2 and Associated Results
Prior to turning to the primary results of this paper in §§ 3-4, the relationship between
PA2 and HP2 is briefly explored in this section. On the one hand, in § 2.2, a brief self-
contained proof of Frege and Boolos’s result that PA2 and HP2 are mutually interpretable
is presented (cf. Corollary 24). On the other hand, in § 2.1, some of the ways in which
the standard models of HP2 are similar to and different from the standard models of PA2
are examined. The standard model of PA2 is the structure from equation (1), namely,
(ω, 0, s,+,×,≤, P (ω)), while the standard models of HP2 are the structures from equa-
tion (7), namely, structures of the form (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α), where α is an ordinal
which is not a cardinal and where #α : P (α)→ α denotes cardinality. In § 2.1, it is shown
that these standard models of HP2 depend only on the cardinality of α for α ≥ ω + ω
(Proposition 10 (i)), and further that they can have many automorphisms, unlike the
standard model of PA2 (cf. Proposition 11 (iv)). Finally, it is shown that there is an
analogue of the relative categoricity of PA2 in the setting of HP2 (cf. Proposition 14 and
Remark 15).
2.1. Models of HP2 from Infinite Cardinals
Proposition 8. Suppose α, β are ordinals that are not cardinals, and consider the struc-
tures (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α) and (β, P (β), P (β
2), . . . ,#β), where #α : P (α) → α and
#β : P (β)→ β denote cardinality.
(i) The structures (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α) and (β, P (β), P (β
2), . . . ,#β) model HP
2.
(ii) If α = ω + k + 1 where k ≥ 0, then |α− rng(#α)| = k
(iii) If α ≥ ω + ω, then |α− rng(#α)| = |α|.
(iv) The structures (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α) and (β, P (β), P (β
2), . . . ,#β) are isomor-
phic if and only if α = β or α, β ≥ ω + ω and |α| = |β|.
Proof. For (i), note that restricting attention to ordinals α which are not cardinals serves
the purpose of ensuring that #(α) < α, so that dom(#α) is P (α) and so that rng(#α) is a
subset of α. Further, note that (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α) satisfies Hume’s Principle by the
definition of cardinality. Further, note that by the Power Set Axiom and the Separation
Axiom, the structure (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α) satisfies the full comprehension schema.
Hence, in fact (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α) is a model of HP
2.
For (ii), note that α− rng(#α) = {ω + 1, . . . , ω + k}, which has cardinality k.
For (iii), note that since α ≥ ω + ω, we have that α − ω is infinite, and hence
|α| = |α− ω|. Case One: α is a limit ordinal. Then the mapping from α − ω to
α − rng(#α) given by β 7→ β + 1 is an injection. Case Two: α is a successor ordinal.
Then α = γ + n where n > 0 and γ is a limit ordinal. Then |α| = |α− ω| = |γ − ω|.
Then the mapping from γ −ω to α− rng(#α) given by β 7→ β + 1 is an injection. Hence
in both cases we have |α− rng(#α)| = |α|.
For (iv), suppose that the two structures are isomorphic. Then this isomorphism
induces a bijection from α onto β, and hence α and β have the same cardinality. Further,
suppose for the sake of contradiction that α 6= β and it is not the case that α, β ≥ ω+ω.
If α < β < ω + ω, then by part (ii) we have that |α− rng(#α)| < |β − rng(#β)| < ω,
and so the two structures are not elementarily equivalent and hence not isomorphic,
which is a contradiction. If α < ω + ω ≤ β, then by parts (ii) and (iii) we have that
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|α− rng(#α)| < ω ≤ |β − rng(#β)|, and so the two structures are not elementarily
equivalent and hence not isomorphic, which is a contradiction. Hence, in fact, we must
have that α = β or α, β ≥ ω + ω and |α| = |β|.
Conversely, suppose that α, β ≥ ω + ω have the same cardinality, so that rng(#α) =
rng(#β) by definition, and hence that |α− rng(#α)| = |α| = |β| = |β − rng(#β)| by
part (iii). Hence choose a bijection f : α→ β such that f(γ) = γ on rng(#α). Extend f
to a bijection f : P (α) → P (β) by setting f(X) = {f(x) : x ∈ X}. Since f(γ) = γ on
rng(#α) and since f is a bijection, we have that
f(#α(X)) = f(|X|) = |X| = |{f(x) : x ∈ X}| =
∣∣f(X)∣∣ = #β(f(X)) (29)
Hence, f is an isomorphism.
Definition 9. If κ is a cardinal, then define the ordinal
Hκ =

ω + κ+ 1 if κ < ω,
ω + ω if κ = ω
κ+ 1 if κ > ω.
(30)
and define the structure
Hκ = (Hκ, P (Hκ), P (H2κ), . . . ,#κ) (31)
where #κ : P (Hκ)→ Hκ denotes cardinality.
Proposition 10.
(i) For every ordinal α that is not a cardinal, there is exactly one cardinal κ such that
the structure Hκ is isomorphic to the structure (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α), where
#α : P (α)→ α denotes cardinality.
(ii) If κ is a cardinal then |Hκ − rng(#κ)| = κ.
(iii) If κ, λ are cardinals, then Hκ and Hλ are isomorphic if and only if κ = λ.
Proof. For (ii), there are three cases. First, suppose that κ = k < ω. Then Hκ −
rng(#κ) = {ω + 1, . . . , ω + k}. Second, suppose that κ = ω. Then Hκ − rng(#κ) =
{ω + n : 0 < n < ω}. Third, suppose that κ > ω. Then by Proposition 8 (iii),
|Hκ − rng(#κ)| = |κ+ 1− rng(#)| = |κ+ 1| = κ.
For (iii), note that the right-to-left direction is trivial. For the left-to-right direction,
suppose for the sake of contradiction that Hκ and Hλ are isomorphic and that κ 6= λ.
Then without loss of generality, κ < λ. First suppose that κ < λ < ω. Then part (ii)
implies that Hκ and Hλ are not elementarily equivalent, since Hκ models that there are
exactly κ elements not in the range of #, whereas Hκ models that there are exactly λ
elements not in the range of #. Second suppose that κ < ω ≤ λ. Then likewise the
structures Hκ and Hλ are not elementarily equivalent, since Hκ models that there are
exactly κ many elements not in the range of #, whereas Hλ models that there are at
least κ + 1 many elements not in the range of #. Third, suppose that κ = ω < λ. But
this cannot happen, since the isomorphism from Hκ and Hλ would induce a bijection
between the first-order parts of these structures, which, respectively, have cardinality ω
and λ > ω. Fourth, suppose that ω < κ < λ. Again this cannot happen, since the
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isomorphism from Hκ and Hλ would induce a bijection between the first-order parts of
these structures, which respectively, have cardinality κ and λ > κ.
For (i), note that uniqueness follows from part (iii). For existence, there are two
cases. If α < ω + ω, then α = ω + k + 1 where k ≥ 0. Then of course the structure
(α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α) is identical with the structure Hk. If α ≥ ω + ω, then by
Proposition 8 (iv), we have that (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#α) is isomorphic to H|α|.
Proposition 11. Suppose that κ is a cardinal.
(i) If β, γ ∈ (Hκ − rng(#κ)) then there is f ∈ Aut(Hκ) such that f(β) = γ.
(ii) If X ⊆ Hκ is ∅-definable in Hκ then X ⊆ rng(#κ) or (Hκ − rng(#κ)) ⊆ X.
(iii) If β ∈ rng(#κ) and f ∈ Aut(Hκ) then f(β) = β.
(iv) Aut(Hκ) and Aut(κ) are isomorphic, where we view κ as a structure in the empty
signature.
Proof. (i) Let f : Hκ → Hκ by setting f(γ) = β, f(β) = γ, and let f be the identity
otherwise, so that f is a bijection of Hκ. Extend f to a mapping f : Hκ → Hκ by setting
f(X) = {f(x) : x ∈ X}. Then f is clearly a bijection since f is a bijection. To show that
it is an automorphism of the structure Hκ, it suffices to show that f(#κX) = #κf(X).
But, since f is the identity on rng(#κ), we have that f(#κX) = f(#κX) = #κX,
and since f is a bijection, we have that f  X : X → f(X) is a bijection, and so
#κX = #κf(X). Hence, in fact f is an automorphism of Hκ which sends β to γ.
(ii) Suppose that X ⊆ Hk is ∅-definable inHκ, but it is not the case that X ⊆ rng(#κ)
or (Hκ− rng(#κ)) ⊆ X. Then there is β ∈ X∩ (Hκ− rng(#κ)) and γ ∈ (Hκ− rng(#κ))∩
(Hκ − X). By part (i), there is f ∈ Aut(Hκ) such that f(β) = γ. But since X is
∅-definable, we have that β ∈ X if and only if γ = f(β) ∈ X, which is a contradiction.
(iii) Suppose that β ∈ rng(#κ) and f ∈ Aut(Hκ) and f(β) 6= β. Since rng(#κ) is
∅-definable and β ∈ rng(#κ), we have that f(β) ∈ rng(#κ). Case One: f(β) < β. Note
that the relation < on rng(#κ) is ∅-definable, since on rng(#κ) we have
λ ≤ λ′ ⇐⇒ Hκ |= ∃ X ∃ Y #κ(X) = λ & #κ(Y ) = λ′ & ∃ injective f : X → Y (32)
Then our case assumption f(β) < β implies f(f(β)) < f(β) < β and so we obtain an
infinite decreasing sequence of ordinals, which is a contradiction. Case Two: β < f(β).
Since f ∈ Aut(Hκ) we have that f−1 ∈ Aut(Hκ), and since β < f(β) we have f−1(β) < β,
since again the relation < on rng(#κ) is ∅-definable. Hence, by iterating f−1(f−1(β)) <
f−1(β) < β as before, we again obtain an infinite decreasing sequence of ordinals, which
is a contradiction.
(iv) If X is a set viewed as a structure in the empty signature, then Aut(X) is just
the set of permutations of X, and hence if X and Y have the same cardinality, then
Aut(X) and Aut(Y ) are isomorphic as groups. Hence by Proposition 10 (ii), we have
that Aut(κ) and Aut(Hκ − rng(#)) are isomorphic as groups. So it suffices to find a
group isomorphism F : Aut(Hκ − rng(#))→ Aut(Hκ).
To this end, given a bijection f : Hκ → Hκ, extend f to a mapping f : Hκ → Hκ by
setting f(X) = {f(x) : x ∈ X}, so that f : Hκ → Hκ is a bijection. Then we claim that
f ∈ Aut(Hκ)⇐⇒ f  (rng(#κ)) = idrng(#κ) (33)
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The left-to-right direction follows directly from part (iii). For the right-to-left direction, it
suffices to show that f(#κX) = #κf(X). Since f is the identity on rng(#κ), we have that
f(#κX) = f(#κX) = #κX, and since f is a bijection, we have that f  X : X → f(X) is
a bijection, and so #κX = #κf(X). Hence, equation (33) does hold, and so we can define
F : Aut(Hκ − rng(#κ))→ Aut(Hκ) by setting F (g) = f , where f is g on Hκ − rng(#κ)
and where f is the identity on rng(#κ). Since F (g1 ◦ g2) = F (g1) ◦ F (g2), we have that
F witnesses the group isomorphism between Aut(Hκ − rng(#κ)) and Aut(Hκ).
Remark 12. The proof of the theorem above shows one how to construct many natural
examples of sentences that are independent of HP2. For instance, in equation (32), it was
shown how to define the ordering in Hκ. Using this, one can form a sentence ϕ such
that Hκ |= ϕ if and only if κ is an infinite successor cardinal, so that Hω2 |= HP2 + ϕ
and Hωω |= HP2 + ¬ϕ. This contrasts starkly with the case of PA2, where there are
comparatively few known examples of natural independent sentences.
Remark 13. The structures Hκ for κ < ω from Definition 9 are on one level very
different: for, they are not elementarily equivalent since Hκ models that there are exactly
κ-many elements that are not in the range of the #-function. However, on another level,
these structures are very similar to each other: for, when κ < ω, it is easy to see that
Hκ is isomorphic to the structure (ω, P (ω), P (ω2), . . . ,#∗κ), where #∗κ(X) = 0 if X is
infinite and where #∗κ(X) = κ+ 1 + |X| if X is finite. Further, when one restricts to the
ranges of the #∗κ-functions, the induced structures (rng(#
∗
κ), P (ω)∩ P (rng(#∗κ)), P (ω)∩
P (rng(#∗κ)
2), . . . ,#∗κ) are all isomorphic to the structure (ω, P (ω), P (ω
2), . . . ,#∗) where
#∗(X) = 0 if X is infinite and where #∗(X) = 1+ |X| if X is finite. As the next theorem
indicates, this is a very general phenomenon among models of HP2: namely, so long as
different #-functions on one and the same underlying set can in some sense see each
other, they yield isomorphic structures when one restricts attention to their ranges.
Proposition 14. Suppose that (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#1,#2) is a structure where Sn ⊆ P (Mn)
and where #i : S1 → M . Suppose further that the structures (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#i) are
models of HP2 for i ∈ {1, 2}, and further that the structure (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#1,#2) satisfies
every instance of the comprehension schema (8), in the signature that includes both of the
function symbols #1,#2. Finally, for i ∈ {1, 2}, define the following induced structure:
Ni = (rng(#i), S1 ∩ P (rng(#i)), S2 ∩ P (rng(#i)2), . . . ,#i) (34)
Then N1 and N2 are isomorphic models of HP2.
Proof. First we define a bijection Γ : rng#1 → rng#2. If #1X ∈ rng#1 where X ∈ S1,
then we define Γ(#1X) = #2X. Note that Γ : rng#1 → rng#2 is well-defined: if
#1X = #1Y then we need to show that #2X = #2Y . This follows, since
#1X = #1Y =⇒ [∃ bijection f : X → Y ] =⇒ #2X = #2Y (35)
Next, note that Γ : rng#1 → rng#2 is injective:
Γ(#1X) = Γ(#1Y ) =⇒ #2X = #2Y =⇒ [∃ bijection f : X → Y ] =⇒ #1X = #1Y
(36)
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Finally, note that Γ : rng#1 → rng#2 is surjective: if #2X ∈ rng#2 then by definition
Γ(#1X) = #2X. Hence, in fact Γ : rng#1 → rng#2 is a bijection. Further, note that
the graph of Γ is in S2 since one has the equality
graph(Γ) = {(x, y) ∈M2 : ∃ Z #1(Z) = x & #2(Z) = y} (37)
and since it was assumed that the structure (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#1,#2) satisfies every instance
of the comprehension schema (8) in the signature that includes both of the function
symbols #1,#2. Now, extend to Γ : N1 → N2 by setting Γ(X) = {Γ(x) : x ∈ X}, which
exists in S1 since the graph of Γ is in S2. Then Γ : N1 → N2 is an isomorphism, because
Γ(#1X) = Γ(#1X) = #2X = #2{Γ(x) : x ∈ X} = #2Γ(X), (38)
where the first and second equalities follow respectively from the definitions of Γ and Γ,
and where the third equality follows from the fact that Γ : X → {Γ(x) : x ∈ X} is a
bijection whose graph is in S2, and where the last equality follows from the definition
of Γ.
Remark 15. The previous proposition can be thought of as an analogue of the relative
categoricity results for models of PA2. In the 19th Century, Dedekind showed that any two
models (M,+,×, P (M), P (M2), . . .) and (N,⊕,⊗, P (N), P (N2), . . .) of PA2 are isomor-
phic ([10] § 132, cf. Shapiro [34] Theorem 4.8 p. 82). However, it is not difficult to see that
Dedekind’s result can be relativized, in the following way: if (M,+,×,⊕,⊗, S1, S2, . . .) is
a structure where Sn ⊆ P (Mn) such that (M,+,×, S1, S2, . . .) and (M,⊕,⊗, S1, S2, . . .)
are models of PA2 and such that (M,+,×,⊕,⊗, S1, S2, . . .) satisfies every instance of the
comprehension schema (8) in the signature of +,×,⊕,⊗, then (M,+,×, S1, S2, . . .) and
(M,⊕,⊗, S1, S2, . . .) are isomorphic (cf. Parsons [31] § 49 pp. 279 ff). The previous
proposition is simply the analogue of this phenomenon in the setting of HP2.
2.2. The Mutual Interpretability of PA2 and HP2
The goal of this section is to present a brief and self-contained proof of the result that
PA2 is mutually interpretable with HP2 (Corollary 24). One half of this result, namely,
the interpretability of HP2 in PA2 is due to Boolos (Corollary 23). The other half of
the result, namely, the interpretability of PA2 in HP2 is now called Frege’s Theorem,
namely (Corollary 21). The proof of Frege’s Theorem can be broken down into two steps:
first, the proof that PA2 is interpretable in the theory consisting of (Q1)-(Q2) and the
comprehension schema (3) (cf. Theorem 16), and second the argument that this latter
theory is interpretable in HP2 (cf. Theorem 20). Elements of the first step can be found
in Dedekind (cf. [10] § 72), and elements of this second step can be traced back to Frege
(cf. Boolos and Heck [7]).
However, the modern presentation stems from Wright [43] pp. 154-169 (cf. also Boo-
los [5]). The warrant for including a proof of this result here is two-fold: (i) the proof
presented here is slightly briefer than other published presentations, and (ii) the proof
presented here is slightly different from other published presentations in that it is cen-
tered around the notion of Dedekind-finiteness, defined in terms of the lack of injective
non-surjective functions, as opposed to Frege’s ancestral notion (cf. the relation X ⊀ X
in Proposition 18 and Theorem 20).
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The observations recorded in this section about the Π1n-comprehension schema are
due to Heck ([21] p. 192) and Linnebo ([24] p. 161). The trick of defining the graph of
addition and multiplication in terms of its initial segments in the proof of Theorem 16 is
adapted from Burgess and Hazen [9] pp. 6-10, although their concern there was not with
Frege’s Theorem.
Theorem 16. PA2 is interpretable in the theory consisting of (Q1)-(Q2) and the com-
prehension schema (3). More generally, Π1n − CA0 is interpretable in the theory consisting
of (Q1)-(Q2) and the comprehension schema (3) restricted to Π1n-formulas for n > 0.
Proof. Suppose that we are working with structureM = (M,S1, S2, . . . , 0, s) that satisfies
(Q1)-(Q2) and the comprehension schema (3) restricted to Π1n-formulas for n > 0. In
what follows, we will refer respectively to the element 0 and the function s as “zero”
and “successor.” It must be shown how to uniformly define a model of Π1n − CA0 within
this structure. We say that X in S1 is inductive if it contains zero and is closed under
successor. Let N be the intersection of all the inductive sets X in S1, which exists in
S1 by Π
1
1-comprehension. Note that zero is in N by construction, and note that N is
closed under successor: for, if a is in N then a is contained in every inductive set X,
and by definition of inductive sets, it follows that the successor of a is contained in every
inductive set X, which is to say that the successor of a is in N .
Hence, we can define the structure N = (N,S1∩P (N), S2∩P (N2), . . . , 0, s) uniformly
withinM. This structure then satisfies (Q1)-(Q2) sinceM satisfies (Q1)-(Q2). Further,
N satisfies the Mathematical Induction Axiom (2), since if F ∈ S1 ∩ P (N) contains zero
and is closed under successor, then F ∈ S1 contains zero and is closed under successor,
and so by definition of N , it follows that N ⊆ F ⊆ N . For (Q3), let X be the subset
of N for which the conclusion holds, i.e., X = {a ∈ N : a 6= 0 → ∃ w ∈ N x = sw}.
Clearly zero is in X, and suppose that a ∈ X ⊆ N : then of course sa = sw for some
w ∈ N , namely w = a, and hence sa ∈ X. Hence, by the Mathematical Induction
Axiom (2), it follows that X = N . Finally, before turning to the remainder of the axioms
of Robinson’s Q, note that sinceM satisfies Π1n-comprehension, we have that N satisfies
Π1n-comprehension as well, since the second-order parts of N are just the second-order
parts of M restricted to subsets of N .
To verify axioms Q4-Q5 of Robinson’s Q, we must first define addition. Let x+ y = z
if and only if there is a graph of a partial function G ⊆ N3 such that (x, y, z) ∈ G ⊆ N3
and
(x, 0, x) ∈ G & [(x, sy, z) ∈ G→ ∃ w sw = z & (x, y, w) ∈ G] (39)
That is, we define the graph of addition as the union of its initial segments. Note
that this graph of addition exists by the Π11-Comprehension Schema. Further, note that
addition is well-defined on its domain. Suppose thatG0 andG1 are partial functions which
satisfy equation (39) and fix an arbitrary x and let Y = {y ∈ N : ∀ z0, z1 (x, y, z0) ∈
G0 & (x, y, z1) ∈ G1 → z0 = z1}. Clearly, 0 ∈ Y and if y ∈ Y and (x, sy, z0) ∈ G0 and
(x, sy, z1) ∈ G1 then there is w0, w1 such that sw0 = z0 and sw1 = z1 and (x, y, w0) ∈ G0
and (x, y, w1) ∈ G1. Then since y ∈ Y we have w0 = w1 and hence z0 = sw0 =
sw1 = z1. Hence, in fact, addition is a well-defined function on its domain. To show
that it is a total function, fix an arbitrary x and let Y = {y ∈ N : ∃ z x + y = z}.
Clearly, 0 ∈ Y , since we can choose G = {(x, 0, x)}. Suppose that y ∈ Y , say, with
(x, y, z) ∈ G. To see that sy ∈ Y , set G′ = G∪{(x, sy, sz)}. Then clearly G′ also satisfies
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equation (39). Hence, in fact, addition is a total function. Finally, the verification of Q4
and Q5 follows directly from our construction in equation (39). To verify Q6-Q7, just
define multiplication analogously.
Remark 17. Hence, it remains to show that the theory consisting of (Q1)-(Q2) and
the comprehension schema (3) is interpretable in HP2. In preparation for this result
(Theorem 20), we first record some elementary considerations in the following proposition.
Proposition 18. Suppose that (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#) models AHP0. For X, Y in S1, define
X ≺ Y if and only if there is injective non-surjective function f : X → Y such that
graph(f) is in S2. Then for a, b ∈M and X,U,A,B in S1, it follows that
(i) If a /∈ X and X ∪ {a} ≺ X ∪ {a} then X ≺ X.
(ii) If a /∈ X and U ≺ X ∪ {a} then U ≺ X or #U = #X.
(iii) If a ∈ A, b ∈ B, then #A = #B if and only if #(A− {a}) = #(B − {b})
(iv) If X 6= ∅ then ∅ ≺ X
(v) X ⊀ ∅
Proof. For (i), suppose that f : X∪{a} → X∪{a} is an injection that is not a surjection.
If f(X) ⊆ X and f : X → X is surjective, then f(a) = a and hence f : X∪{a} → X∪{a}
would be surjective, contrary to hypothesis; hence when f(X) ⊆ X, it must be the case
that f : X → X is injective but not surjective. On the other hand, when f(X) * X then
say f(y) = a where y ∈ X and f(a) = z ∈ X, and hence define g : X → X by g(y) = z
and g = f otherwise. Then g is injective and misses the same point that f does. Further,
the graph of g exists by the arithmetical comprehension schema.
For (ii), suppose that f : U → X ∪ {a} is an injection which is not a surjection. If
f(U) ⊆ X then #U = #X when f : U → X is a bijection and U ≺ X otherwise. If
f(U) * X then say f(y) = a and f misses b ∈ X, in which case we define an injective
function g : U → X by g(y) = b and g = f otherwise. The graph of g exists by the
arithmetical comprehension schema. If g is a bijection, then #U = #X and U ≺ X
otherwise.
For (iii), suppose that a ∈ A and b ∈ B and let us first establish the left-to-right
direction. So suppose that f : A → B is a bijection. If f(a) = b then f  (A − {a})
is the desired bijection. If f(a) = d for d 6= b and f(c) = b for c 6= a, then define a
bijection g : (A− {a})→ (B − {b}) by g(c) = d and g = f otherwise. The graph of this
function g then exists by the arithmetical comprehension schema. Now let us establish
the right-to-left direction. Suppose that g : (A− {a}) → (B − {b}) is a bijection. Then
define f : A → B by f(a) = b and f = g otherwise. Then the graph of f exists by the
arithmetical comprehension schema and f is a bijection since g was a bijection.
For (iv), note that the “empty” binary relation witnesses that there is an injective
non-surjective function from ∅ to X.
For (v), note that if X ≺ ∅, then there would be an injective non-surjective function
f : X → ∅, which would imply that there was an element in ∅ \ rng(f), which would
imply that there was some element in ∅.
Remark 19. It is well-known that the chief difficulty in the proof of the following the-
orem is establishing the totality of the successor function (cf. remarks to this effect in
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Wright [43] p. 161). Prior to looking at the proof, it is helpful to think about what hap-
pens on the standard models (α, P (α), P (α2), . . . ,#) from § 2.1, where α is an ordinal
which is not a cardinal and where # : P (α) → α is cardinality. It is easy to see that ω
is uniformly definable in each of these structures. Further, it is easy to see that for each
n ∈ ω, it follows that
{#W : W ≺ {0, . . . , n}} = {0, . . . , n} (40)
where as in the previous proposition, X ≺ Y if and only if there is injective non-surjective
function f : X → Y . From this we see that
{0, . . . , n} ⊀ {0, . . . , n} & #{0, . . . , n} = #{#W : W ≺ {0, . . . , n}} (41)
as well as
s(#{0, . . . , n}) = s(n+ 1) = n+ 2 = #({0, . . . , n} ∪ {n+ 1})
= #({#W : W ≺ {0, . . . , n}} ∪ {#({0, . . . , n})}) (42)
The entire idea of the below proof is to show that we can replicate these considerations
in arbitrary models of HP2. So in such an arbitrary model, we will define an analogue N
of ω, and for analogues X of {0, . . . , n}, we will find that
s(#X) = #({#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X}) (43)
This, in any case, is the heuristic explanation of the proof of the totality of the successor
function in the following theorem.
Theorem 20. The theory consisting of (Q1)-(Q2) and the comprehension schema (3) is
interpretable in HP2. More generally, the theory consisting of (Q1)-(Q2) and the compre-
hension schema (3) restricted to Π1n-formulas is interpretable in Π
1
n − HP0 for n > 0.
Proof. Suppose that we are working with structureM = (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#) that satisfies
Π1n − HP0. It must be shown how to uniformly define a model of (Q1)-(Q2) and the
comprehension schema (3) restricted to Π1n-formulas. Define 0 = #∅ and define s(x, y)
if and only if there is X, Y in S1 such that #X = x,#Y = y, and there is b ∈ Y such
that #X = #(Y − {b}). That is, s(x, y) says that x, y are respectively cardinalities of
sets X, Y and the cardinality of X is equal to the cardinality of Y minus one point. Note
that the relation s exists in S2 by the Π
1
1-comprehension schema. In what follows, we will
respectively refer to the element 0 and the relation s as “zero” and “successor,” keeping
in mind that formally s is a binary relation. Then say that X in S1 is inductive if it
contains zero and is closed under successors, that is, if x ∈ X and s(x, y) then y ∈ X.
Then define N to be the intersection of all the inductive sets, so that N is in S1 by
the Π11-comprehension schema. Now we show that (i) s is a well-defined function on its
domain, and that (ii) s is a total function on N , and that (iii) s maps elements of N to
elements of N , and that (iv) s satisfies axioms Q1-Q2 on N .
For (i), to see that s is well-defined, suppose that s(x, y) and s(x, z). Then x = #X,
y = #Y , z = #Z and there exists b ∈ Y, c ∈ Z such that #X = #(Y −{b}) = #(Z−{c}).
Then by the right-to-left direction of Proposition 18 (iii), it follows that #Y = #Z and
hence y = #Y = #Z = z. Hence, s is a well-defined function on its domain.
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For (ii), recall from Proposition 18 that for X, Y in S1, we say X ≺ Y if and only if
there is an injective non-surjective function f : X → Y such that graph(f) is in S2. Then
by iterated applications of Π11-comprehension, the following exist in S2 and S1 respectively
R = {(#W,#X) : W ≺ X} (44)
Z = {#X : X ⊀ X & ∃ Y (∀ w w ∈ Y ↔ (w,#X) ∈ R) & #X = #Y } (45)
Note that
Z = {#X : X ⊀ X & #X = #({#W : W ≺ X})} (46)
(It may be heuristically helpful to compare this with equation (41)). Suppose that #X
is in Z. Then X ⊀ X and #X = #({#W : W ≺ X}). Then
s(#X,#({#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X})) (47)
(Likewise, it may be helpful to compare this with equation (43)). Hence, we have the
inclusion Z ⊆ {x : ∃ y s(x, y)}, and so it suffices to show that Z is inductive.
Clearly, 0 ∈ Z. Suppose that #X is in Z, so that X ⊀ X and #X = #({#W : W ≺
X}). Then s(#X,#({#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X})). Since successor is well-defined on its
domain by part (i), it suffices to show that #({#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X}) is in Z. We
have {#W : W ≺ X} ⊀ {#W : W ≺ X}. Since #X /∈ {#W : W ≺ X}, it follows from
Proposition 18 (i) that {#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X} ⊀ {#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X}. Hence,
#({#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X}) satisfies the first conjunct of Z in equation (46). To see
that #({#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X}) satisfies the second conjunct of Z in equation (46), it
suffices to show that
{#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X} = {#U : U ≺ {#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X}} (48)
For the left-to-right direction, suppose first that W ≺ X. Since X is bijective with {#W :
W ≺ X}, we have that W ≺ {#W : W ≺ X}∪ {#X}. Continuing with the left-to-right
direction, suppose now that #U = #X. Since X is bijective with {#W : W ≺ X},
we have that #U = #({#W : W ≺ X}) and hence U ≺ {#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X}.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose that U ≺ {#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X}. Since
#X /∈ {#W : W ≺ X}, we have by Proposition 18 (ii) that #U = #({#W : W ≺
X}) = #X or U ≺ {#W : W ≺ X}. Hence, in fact equation (48) holds. It follows that
#({#W : W ≺ X} ∪ {#X}) is in Z. Hence, Z is an inductive set, and as mentioned at
the close of the above paragraph, it thus follows that successor is a total function on N .
(iii) Now we show that successor maps elements of N to elements of N . Suppose that
a is in N . Then by definition, a is contained in every inductive set, and by parts (i)-(ii), it
follows that there is unique b such that s(a, b), from which it follows that b is contained in
every inductive set, so that b is contained in N as well. Hence, successor maps elements
of N to elements of N .
(iv) Finally, we note that the successor function s satisfies axioms (Q1)-(Q2). To
see that it satisfies (Q1), note that if s#X = 0 = #∅, then ∅ would be bijective with
a non-empty set, which is a contradiction. To see that it satisfies (Q2), suppose that
s#X = s#Y . Then s#X = #A where #X = #(A − {a}) for some a ∈ A and
s#Y = #B where #Y = #(B − {b}) for some b ∈ B. Then the left-to-right direction of
Proposition 18 (iii) implies that #X = #(A− {a}) = #(B − {b}) = #Y .
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Putting this all together, we can uniformly define the structureN = (N,S1∩P (N), S2∩
P (N2), . . . , 0, s) which satisfies (Q1)-(Q2). Finally, note that since M satisfies Π1n-
comprehension, we have thatN satisfies Π1n-comprehension as well, since the second-order
parts of N are just the second-order parts of M restricted to subsets of N .
Corollary 21. PA2 is interpretable in HP2. More generally, Π1n − CA0 is interpretable in
Π1n − HP0 for n > 0.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 20 and Theorem 16.
Remark 22. The following theorem was first noted by Boolos ([3]). We include here
for the sake of having a relatively self-contained presentation of the main results in this
area, and because we will use Boolos’ construction to transfer facts about the provability
relation from subsystems of PA2 to subsystems of HP2 (cf. the proofs of Proposition 46
and Proposition 48).
Theorem 23. HP2 is interpretable in PA2. More generally, Π1n − HP0 is interpretable in
Π1n − CA0 for n > 0, and Σ11 − PH0 is interpretable in Σ11 − AC0 and AHP0 is interpretable in
ACA0.
Proof. We begin with the proof of the interpretability of AHP0 in ACA0. We will note
how this proof yields all the other results as well. Let us work in a model M =
(M,S1, S2, . . . ,⊕,⊗) of ACA0, where Sn ⊆ P (Mn). We must show how to uniformly
define a model of AHP0. Consider the model N = (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#) where #(X) = n+ 1
if |X| = n, and where #(X) = 0 if X is infinite. Then N is clearly definable in M since
the graph of X is arithmetically definable. Further, since this graph is arithmetically
definable, it follows that N satisfies the arithmetical comprehension schema. Further, by
Simpson [35] Lemma II.3.6 p. 70, ACA0 proves that any two infinite sets are bijective, so
that N is a model of AHP0. Hence, in fact we have that AHP0 is interpretable in ACA0.
Further, it is obvious from this construction that N will satisfy whatever comprehension
schemas M satisfies.
Corollary 24. PA2 is mutually interpretable with HP2. More generally, Π1n − CA0 is mu-
tually interpretable with Π1n − HP0 for n > 0.
Proof. This follows immediately from Corollary 21 and Theorem 23.
3. Standard Models of Subsystems of BL2 and Associated Results
The primary goal of this section is to study models of subsystems of BL2 that are
standard in the sense that they have the form (ω, S1, S2, . . . , ∂), where the sets Sn ⊆
P (ωn) all come from some antecedently fixed computational class (e.g. the recursive sets,
the arithmetical sets, the hyperarithmetical sets, etc.). The main result of this section
is Theorem 53 which gives a construction of a standard model of the hyperarithmetic
subsystem of BL0 in terms of the hyperarithmetic subsets of natural numbers. Further,
this construction isolates a certain sentence Inf (cf. Definition 51) such that Σ11 − AC0 ≤I
Σ11 − LB0 + Inf <I Π11 − CA0 (cf. Corollary 54 and Figure 2).
In the preliminary section § 3.1, we record some elementary facts about arbitrary
models of subsystems of BL2, focusing in particular on the fact that arbitrary models of
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the hyperarithmetic subsystems of BL2 require the existence of injective non-surjective
functions (cf. Proposition 31). Such functions are important both because they are
used to define the sentence Inf (cf. Definition 51) and because such functions are not
required to exist by the hyperarithmetic subsystems of HP2 (cf. Remark 30). Further,
in the preliminary section § 3.2, we review some elementary facts about hyperarithmetic
theory, which we will employ in § 3.3. We also use these facts to fill in some parts of the
provability relation (cf. Propositions 40-46 and Figure 1). Finally, in § 3.3, we turn to the
main results of this section, namely the aforementioned Theorem 53 and Corollary 54.
3.1. Generalities on Models of Subsystems of BL2
Proposition 25. Suppose that Y ⊆ M is definable with parameters by an arithmetical
formula in the structure (M,S1, S2, . . . , ∂) (resp. in the structure (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#)).
Then Y is definable with parameters by an arithmetical formula that does not contain
any instances of ∂ (resp. does not contain any instances of #).
Proof. If Y ⊆ M is definable in (M,S1, S2, . . . , ∂) by an arithmetical formula ϕ, and if
∂(P ) appears in ϕ, then P is not free in ϕ but rather is a parameter from S1 and hence
a = ∂(P ) is a parameter from M . So, replacing parameters from S1 with parameters
from M , it follows that the set Y is also definable by an arithmetical formula that does
not contain any instances of ∂.
Proposition 26. Suppose that M is a structure and ∂ : D(M) → M is an injection,
where D(Mn) is the definable subsets of Mn. Then (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . , ∂) is a model
of ABL0.
Proof. It is a model of Basic Law V since ∂ is an injection (cf. discussion subsequent
to (6)). Further, it satisfies the arithmetical comprehension schema, since if X ⊆ M
is defined by an arithmetical formula, then by Proposition 25 it is defined by an arith-
metical formula which does not include any instances of ∂. Hence, since D(M) is closed
under arithmetical comprehension, it follows that X is in D(M), so that the structure
(M,D(M), D(M2), . . . , ∂) satisfies the arithmetical comprehension schema.
Proposition 27. Suppose that (M,S1, S2, . . . , ∂) is a model of ∆
1
1 − BL0. (a) Then there
is a injective function s : M → M such that s(x) = ∂({x}) and such that graph(s) is in
S2. (b) Further, there is a function s : M
n →M such that s(x1, . . . , xn) = ∂({x1, . . . , xn})
and such that graph(s) is in Sn+1.
Proof. The proof of (b) is identical to the proof of (a), so we present only the proof of
(a). It suffices to show three things: first, that the graph of this function is ∆11, second
that this function is well-defined and total, and third that the function is injective. Note
that the following Σ11 and Π
1
1-definitions of s(x) = y agree:
[∃ X (∀ z z ∈ X ↔ z = x) & ∂X = y]⇐⇒ [∀ Y (∀ z z ∈ Y ↔ z = x)→ ∂Y = y] (49)
Suppose that the left-hand-side of this equation holds and that Y = {x}. Then Y = X
and hence ∂(Y ) = ∂(X) = y. Conversely, suppose that the right-hand-side of this
equation holds. By arithmetical comprehension, form the set X = {x}. Then by the
right-hand-side it is the case that ∂(X) = y. Hence, by ∆11-comprehension, there is
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an s such that s(x, y) if and only if both the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of
the above equation holds with respect to x and y. To see that the function is well-
defined, suppose that the left-hand-side holds both of x and y and of x and z. By
arithmetical comprehension, form the set Y = {x}. Then the right-hand-side implies
that y = ∂(Y ) = z. Hence, the function is well-defined. Further, it is everywhere defined
because given x one can use arithmetical comprehension to form X = {x}, and hence
x and y = ∂(X) will satisfy the right-hand-side. Finally, to see that the function X is
injective, suppose that s(x) = s(y). Then ∂({x}) = ∂({y}). By Basic Law V, it follows
that {x} = {y} and hence that x = y.
Remark 28. The following proposition generalizes the construction in the Russell Para-
dox (cf. Proposition (4)). Note that in the following proposition, the term rng∂ is em-
ployed to designate the range of the function ∂. However, this set need not exist in the
second-order parts of any of the models under consideration, even though it is is defined
by a Σ11-formula in these models.
Proposition 29. Suppose that (M,S1, S2, . . . , ∂) is a model of ∆
1
1 − BL0. For every A in
S1 such that A ⊆ rng∂, there is B in S1 such that B ⊆ A and ∂B ∈ rng∂ − A.
Proof. First we claim that for all x it is the case that
[∃ X x ∈ A & ∂X = x & x /∈ X]⇐⇒ [∀ Y x ∈ A & (∂Y = x→ x /∈ Y )] (50)
Suppose that the left-hand-side holds, i.e., suppose that x ∈ A & ∂X = x & x /∈ X, and
further suppose that Y is such that ∂Y = x. Then ∂X = x = ∂Y and Basic Law V
implies that X = Y . Conversely, suppose that the right-hand-side holds, i.e., suppose it is
the case that ∀ Y x ∈ A & (∂Y = x→ x /∈ Y ). Since x ∈ A ⊆ rng∂, there is X such that
∂X = x, and hence x /∈ X. The claim is proved, and, hence, by the ∆11-Comprehension
Schema, there exists B such that x ∈ B if and only if both the left-hand-side and right-
hand-side of (50) hold with respect to x. Note that it follows automatically from the
left-hand-side that B ⊆ A. So it remains to show that ∂B ∈ rng∂ − A. Suppose not.
Then ∂B ∈ rng∂∩A. Then either ∂B ∈ B or ∂B /∈ B. If ∂B ∈ B then by right-hand-side
we have ∂B /∈ B, which is a contradiction. If ∂B /∈ B, then by the left-hand-side we
have that ∀ X ∂B /∈ A ∨ ∂X 6= ∂B ∨ ∂B ∈ X. Applying this to X = B we have that
∂B /∈ A ∨ ∂B 6= ∂B ∨ ∂B ∈ B. Since by hypothesis we have that ∂B ∈ rng∂ ∩ A,
we must conclude that ∂B ∈ B, which again contradicts our supposition. Hence, in fact,
∂B ∈ rng∂ − A.
Remark 30. The following corollary is important because it shows that satisfying ∆11 − BL0
requires the existence of injective non-surjective functions. As we note in Proposition 32
and later in Corollary 73, this is not the case with ABL0 and ∆
1
1 − HP0.
Corollary 31. Suppose that (M,S1, S2, . . . , ∂) is a model of ∆
1
1 − BL0. Then there is a
injective non-surjective function s : M → M such that graph(s) is in S2 and such that
s(x) = ∂({x}).
Proof. By Proposition 27 there is an injective function s : M → M such that rng(s) ⊆
rng∂ and such that graph(s) is in S2 and such that s(x) = ∂({x}). By Proposition 29,
there is B in S1 such that B ⊆ rng(s) and ∂B ∈ rng∂ − rng(s). Hence, s : M → M is
not surjective.
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Proposition 32. There is a structure (M,S1, S2, . . .) such that
(i) For any injection ∂ : S1 → M it is the case that (M,S1, S2, . . . , ∂) models both
the theory ABL0 as well as the sentence that expresses that there are no injective
non-surjective functions f : M →M .
(ii) There is no injection ∂ : S1 →M such that (M,S1, S2, . . . , ∂) models ∆11 − BL0.
Proof. Let M be an algebraically closed field (cf. Marker [26] Example 4.3.10 p. 140)
and let Sn = D(M
n), i.e. the definable subsets of Mn. Suppose that s : M → M
was an injective surjective function whose graph was in S2 = D(M
2). Then this implies
that there is a definable injective non-surjective function s : M → M , which contradicts
Ax’s Theorem (cf. Theorem 65). For (i), note that by Proposition 26, the structure
(M,S1, S2, . . . , ∂) is a model of ABL0 for any injection ∂ : D(k)→ k. For (ii), note that if
there was such an injection ∂ : S1 →M , then by Corollary 31, there would be an injective
non-surjective s : M →M such that graph(s) is in S2, which is a contradiction.
3.2. Hyperarithmetic Theory and Some Related Elementary Results
Definition 33. Suppose that X, Y ∈ 2ω. Then X ≤T Y if X is Turing computable
from Y or if X is ∆0,Y1 . Further, X ≤a Y if X is arithmetical in Y or if there is n > 0
such that X is ∆0,Yn . Finally, X ≤h Y if X is hyperarithmetic in Y or if X is ∆1,Y1 (For
computational definitions of these reducibilities and proofs that they correspond with
the relevant definability notion, see respectively Soare [36] p. 64, Odifreddi [30] p. 375,
Sacks [33] p. 44).
Definition 34. Suppose that Y ∈ 2ω. Then define
REC(Y ) = {X ∈ 2ω : X ≤T Y } (51)
ARITH(Y ) = {X ∈ 2ω : X ≤a Y } (52)
HYP(Y ) = {X ∈ 2ω : X ≤h Y } (53)
Further, let REC = REC(∅) and ARITH = ARITH(∅) and HYP = HYP(∅) (cf. Simp-
son [35] Remark I.7.5. p. 25, Example I.11.2 p. 39).
Remark 35. Recall that structures in the language of HP2 and BL2 have the form
(M,S1, S2, . . . ,#), where Sn ⊆ P (Mn) and # : S1 → M (cf. equation (4)). If
# : HYP(Y ) → ω, then (ω,HYP(Y ),#) will be used as an abbreviation for the struc-
ture (ω, S1, S2, . . . ,#), where Sn ⊆ P (ωn) is the set of n-ary relations whose graph is in
HYP(Y ) under any standard computable pairing function. Similarly, in what follows, we
will sometimes use the abbreviations (ω,REC(Y ),#) and (ω,ARITH(Y ),#).
Proposition 36. The relation X ≤h Y is Π11.
Proof. See Sacks [33] p. 45.
Theorem 37. (Kleene’s Theorem on Restricted Quantification) Suppose that ϕ(X, Y )
is a Π11 predicate. Then ∃ X ≤h Y ϕ(X, Y ) is a Π11-predicate. Moreover, this is provable
in Π11 − CA0.
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Proof. See Kleene [22] and Moschovakis [29] Theorem 4D.3 p. 220. That this theorem is
provable in Π11 − CA0 was noted by Simpson [35] VIII.3.20 p. 330.
Theorem 38. (Spector-Gandy Theorem) Suppose that ϕ(Y ) is a Π11-predicate. Then
there is an arithmetic predicate ψ(X, Y ) such that ϕ(Y )↔ ∃ X ≤h Y ψ(X, Y ).
Proof. See Spector and Gandy ([37], [15]), Sacks [33] Theorem III.3.5 p. 61 and Exer-
cise III.3.13 p. 62.
Remark 39. The following proposition is non-trivial only because the second-order quan-
tifiers must be evaluated with respect to the second-order part S1 ⊆ P (ω) of the struc-
ture (ω, S1) and not with respect to P (ω) itself. For instance, one cannot infer that
(ω,HYP(Y )) |= ¬Π11 − CA0 simply from the fact that OY is Π11 but not Σ11, since to
say this is merely to say that OY is Π11-definable but not Σ11-definable on the structure
(ω, P (ω)).
Proposition 40. Suppose that Y ∈ 2ω. Then (ω,ARITH(Y )) |= ACA0 + ¬∆11 − CA0 and
(ω,HYP(Y )) |= Σ11 − AC0 + ¬Π11 − CA0.
Proof. For the fact that (ω,ARITH(Y )) |= ACA0, see Simpson [35] Theorem VIII.1.13
p. 313. Suppose that (ω,ARITH(Y )) |= ∆11 − CA0. But note that
(n,m) ∈ Y (ω) ⇐⇒ ∃ X ∈ ARITH(Y ) X = ⊕ni=1Y (i) & m ∈ X
⇐⇒ ∀ X ∈ ARITH(Y ) X = ⊕ni=1Y (i) → m ∈ X (54)
and hence Y (ω) ∈ ARITH(Y ), which would contradict Tarski’s Theorem on Truth. Hence,
in fact (ω,ARITH(Y )) |= ¬Σ11 − AC0. For the fact that (ω,HYP(Y )) |= Σ11 − AC0, see
Simpson [35] Theorem VIII.4.5 p. 334 and Theorem VIII.4.8 p. 335. This proof uses
Kleene’s Theorem on Restricted Quantification 37, and below in Theorem 53 we will
emulate this proof in the setting of BL2. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
(ω,HYP(Y )) |= Π11 − CA0. Since OY is Π1,Y1 , by the Spector-Gandy Theorem 38, there is
an arithmetic predicate ψ(n,X, Y ) such that n ∈ OY ⇐⇒ ∃ X ≤h Y ψ(n,X, Y ). Then
OY is Σ11-definable on (ω,HYP(Y )) and hence exists in HYP(Y ) by Π11 − CA0, which
contradicts that OY is not in HYP(Y ).
Corollary 41. Suppose that there is a Π11-formula θ(X, Y, Z) such that for all Z ∈ 2ω
the set GZ = {(X, Y ) ∈ 2ω × 2ω : θ(X, Y, Z)} is the graph of a function gZ : HYP(Z)→
HYP(Z). Then the graphGZ of gZ is Σ
1
1-definable in the structure (ω,HYP(Z)) uniformly
in Z.
Proof. Note that since gZ : HYP(Z)→ HYP(Z), we have that for all X, Y, Z ∈ 2ω
θ(X, Y, Z) =⇒ X ⊕ Y ≤h Z (55)
By the Spector-Gandy Theorem 38, there is an arithmetical predicate ψ(X, Y, Z,W ) such
that for all X, Y, Z ∈ 2ω
θ(X, Y, Z)⇐⇒ ∃ W ≤h X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z ψ(X, Y, Z,W ) (56)
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Putting the two previous equations together, we have that for all X, Y, Z ∈ 2ω
θ(X, Y, Z)⇐⇒ ∃ W ≤h Z ψ(X, Y, Z,W ) (57)
Then for all X, Y, Z ∈ 2ω
gZ(X) = Y ⇐⇒ (ω,HYP(Z)) |= ∃ W ψ(X, Y, Z,W ) (58)
Hence, in fact the graph GZ of gZ is Σ
1
1-definable in the structure (ω,HYP(Z)) uniformly
in Z.
Theorem 42. (Kondo’s Uniformization Theorem) Suppose that ϕ(X, Y ) is a Π11 predi-
cate. Then there is a Π11-predicate ϕ
′(X, Y ) such that
∀ X, Y [ϕ′(X, Y )→ ϕ(X, Y )] (59)
∀ X [∃ Y ϕ(X, Y )]→ [∃!Y ϕ′(X, Y )] (60)
Moreover, this is provable in Π11 − CA0.
Proof. See Moschovakis [29] pp. 235-236. Simpson notes that Kondo’s theorem is provable
in Π11 − CA0 (cf. [35] Theorem VI.2.6 p. 225).
Remark 43. The following two propositions use some of the preceding material to fill
in some information about the provability relation (cf. Figure 1).
Proposition 44. There are models of ABL0 + ¬∆11 − BL0.
Proof. Choose any injection ∂ : ARITH → ω. Then by Proposition 26 the structure
(ω,ARITH, ∂) is a model of ABL0. Further, since the graphs of addition and multiplication
are in ARITH, if (ω,ARITH, ∂) |= ∆11 − BL0, then one would have that ∅(ω) ∈ ARITH (cf.
equation (54)), which would contradict Tarski’s theorem on truth.
Remark 45. The construction in the following proposition is the same construction as
Boolos used to prove the interpretability of HP2 in PA2 (cf. the proof of Theorem 23).
Proposition 46. There are models of AHP0 + ¬∆11 − HP0 and Σ11 − PH0 + ¬Π11 − HP0 and
∆11 − HP0 + ¬Σ11 − PH0
Proof. Define a function # : ARITH→ ω by #X = 0 if X is infinite and #X = |X|+ 1
if X is finite. By Simpson [35] Lemma II.3.6 p. 70, ACA0 proves that any two infinite
sets are bijective, and hence (ω,ARITH,#) is a model of Hume’s Principle. Further,
it satisfies the arithmetical comprehension schema, since if X ⊆ ω is defined by an
arithmetical formula, then by Proposition 25 it is defined by an arithmetical formula that
does not include any instances of #. Hence, since ARITH is closed under arithmetical
comprehension, it follows that X is in ARITH, so that the structure (ω,ARITH,#)
satisfies the arithmetical comprehension schema. Since ∅(ω) /∈ ARITH but ∅(ω) is ∆11-
definable over ARITH using the graphs of addition and multiplication as parameters (cf.
equation (54)), we have that (ω,ARITH,#) is a model of AHP0 + ¬∆11 − HP0. Similarly,
using the fact that the graph of # is arithmetical, we can argue that (ω,HYP,#) is a
model of Σ11 − PH0+¬Π11 − HP0. Likewise, Steel constructs a sequence of reals Gn such that
(ω,
⋃∞
n=1 HYP
G1⊕···⊕Gn) is a model of ∆11 − CA0 + ¬Σ11 − AC0 ([38] Theorem 4 pp. 68 ff),
and we can argue as before that (ω,
⋃∞
n=1 HYP
G1⊕···⊕Gn ,#) is a model of ∆11 − HP0 +
¬Σ11 − PH0.
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Remark 47. The following two propositions use elementary considerations about arith-
metical sets (cf. Definition 34) to record some observations about natural functions whose
existence cannot be proven in ABL0 or AHP0. For the motivation for these propositions,
see § 2.2, and in particular around equation (20). The only reason for including these
propositions here (as opposed to earlier) is that it seemed prudent to delay their proof
until the arithmetical sets had been introduced, which we did earlier in this section (cf.
Definition 34). Note that the construction in the following proposition is analogous to
the construction used by Boolos to prove the interpretability of HP2 in PA2 (cf. the proof
of Theorem 23).
Proposition 48. There is a structure M and a function # : D(M)→M , where D(Mn)
is the definable subsets of Mn, such that (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . ,#) is a model of AHP0,
and further there is binary relation R in D(M2) such that the set {(n,m) : #(Rn) = m}
does not exist in D(M2), where Rn = {x : Rnx}.
Proof. Let M be the standard model of first-order arithmetic (ω,+,×) so that D(M) are
the arithmetical sets ARITH. Choose a real Z /∈ ARITH, such as ∅(ω), and enumerate
Z as z0, z1, z2, . . .. Define the function # : ARITH→ ω by #(X) = zn if X is finite and
|X| = n and define #(X) = z∞ for some fixed z∞ /∈ Z if X is infinite. This structure sat-
isfies arithmetical comprehension, since if X ⊆M is defined by an arithmetical formula,
then by Proposition 25 it is defined by an arithmetical formula which does not include any
instances of #. Hence, since D(M) is closed under arithmetical comprehension, it follows
that X is in D(M), so that the structure (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . ,#) satisfies the arith-
metical comprehension schema. Further, by Simpson [35] Lemma II.3.6 p. 70, ACA0 proves
that any two infinite sets are bijective, and hence the structure (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . ,#)
is a model of Hume’s Principle. Hence, (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . ,#) is a model of AHP0.
Consider now the set R = {(n,m) : m < n}, which is clearly arithmetical and so exists
in D(M2). Then Rn = {x : Rnx} = {0, . . . , n− 1} and #(Rn) = zn. Then the set
{(n,m) : #(Rn) = m} = {(n,m) : zn = m} (61)
is equal to the graph of n 7→ zn, which is not arithmetical: for, if it were arithmetical,
then its range Z would be be arithmetical, which contradicts the hypothesis on Z.
Proposition 49. There is a structure M and an injection ∂ : D(M)→M , where D(Mn)
is the definable subsets of Mn, such that (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . , ∂) is a model of ABL0,
and further there is binary relation R in D(M2) such that the set {(n,m) : ∂(Rn) = m}
does not exist in D(M2), where Rn = {x : Rnx}.
Proof. Let M be the standard model of first-order arithmetic (ω,+,×) so that D(M) are
the arithmetical sets ARITH. Choose a real Z /∈ ARITH, such as ∅(ω), and enumerate
Z as z0, z1, z2, . . .. Choose an injection ∂ : ARITH → ω such that ∂({n}) = zn, which
we can do since Z is coinfinite (since it is not arithmetical). Then by Proposition 26,
the structure (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . , ∂) is a model of ABL0. Consider now the diagonal
R = {(n,m) : n = m} which is clearly arithmetical and so exists in D(M2). Then
Rn = {x : Rnx} = {n} and ∂(Rn) = ∂({n}) = zn. Then the set
{(n,m) : ∂(Rn) = m} = {(n,m) : zn = m} (62)
is equal to the graph of n 7→ zn, which is not arithmetical: for, if it were arithmetical,
then its range Z would be be arithmetical, which contradicts the hypothesis on Z.
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3.3. Standard Models of the Hyperarithmetic Subsystems of BL2
Remark 50. Recall from Proposition 27 that ∆11 − BL0 proves the existence of the graph
of an injective function s : M → M such that s(x) = ∂({x}). This function is is
mentioned in the following axiom.
Definition 51. The following sentence Inf is a sentence in the signature of BL2:
Inf ≡ ∃ s : M →M [∀ x s(x) = ∂({x})] & ∃ N [∂(∅) ∈ N & ∀ x x ∈ N → sx ∈ N ]
& ∀ N ′ [∂(∅) ∈ N ′ & ∀ x x ∈ N ′ → sx ∈ N ′]→ N ⊆ N ′
& ∃ ⊕ : N2 → N ∃ ⊗ : N2 → N ∃  ⊆ N2 [(N, ∂(∅), s,⊕,⊗,) |= (Q1)− (Q8)]
(63)
Intuitively, Inf says that there is a smallest set N which contains the zero element ∂(∅)
and which is closed under the successor function s(x) = ∂({x}) and which has addition
and multiplication functions ⊕ and ⊗ and an ordering relation  which satisfy the eight
axioms of Robinson’s Q.
Remark 52. The following theorem and its corollary is the main result of § 3. Recall that
the Russell paradox showed that BL0 and Π
1
1 − BL0 is inconsistent (cf. Proposition (4)).
Recently Ferreira and Wehmeier ([13]) showed that ∆11 − BL0 is consistent, using Barwise
and Schlipf’s recursively-saturated model construction. In § 4.1, we present a general-
ization of this construction (cf. Theorem 63), which we apply to ∆11 − BL0 and ∆11 − HP0
(cf. Proposition 76, Corollary 92, and Theorem 101). However, the recursively-saturated
model construction does not provide one with natural models, simply because most nat-
ural structures are not recursively saturated (unless of course they are saturated tout
court). Hence, this raises the question of whether there are natural models of ∆11 − BL0.
The following theorem constructs a model of ∆11 − BL0 which is mutually interpretable
with the minimal ω-model of ∆11 − CA0, namely, the model whose second-order part con-
sists of the hyperarithmetic sets.
Theorem 53. For any real Y ∈ 2ω, there is a map ∂Y : HYP(Y ) → ω with Π1,Y1 -graph
such that (i) the structure MY = (ω,HYP(Y ), ∂Y ) is a model of (a) Σ
1
1 − LB0 and (b) the
sentence Inf, and such that (ii) the two structures
MY = (ω,HYP(Y ), ∂Y ), (ω, 0, s,+,×,≤,HYP(Y )) (64)
are mutually interpretable uniformly in Y , in the following sense: (a) the map ∂Y :
HYP(Y ) → ω is definable in (ω,HYP(Y ), 0, s,+,×,≤) uniformly in Y , and (b) an iso-
morphic copy HY of the structure (ω,HYP(Y ), 0, s,+,×,≤) is definable in the structure
MY = (ω,HYP(Y ), ∂Y ) uniformly in Y . Moreover, all these facts are provable in Π
1
1 − CA0.
Proof. Define P (Y ⊕ X,n) iff X ∈ HYP(Y ) and n = 〈a, e〉 is a hyperarithmetical-in-Y
index of X:
P (Y ⊕X, 〈a, e〉) ≡ X ∈ HYP(Y ) & a ∈ OY & X = {e}HYa (65)
Since the relation X ∈ HYP(Y ) is Π11 and membership in HYa is ∆1,Y1 for a ∈ OY , we
have that P (Y ⊕X,n) is a Π11-predicate. By Kondo uniformization (Theorem 42), there
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is a Π11-uniformization P
′ of P . For Y ∈ 2ω, define ∂Y (X) = n if and only if P ′(Y ⊕X,n).
Since ∂Y (X) = n implies that n is a hyperarithmetical-in-Y index of X, we have that
∂Y : HYP(Y ) → ω is an injection and hence MY = (ω,HYP(Y ), ∂Y ) is a model of
Basic Law V. Note that since ∂Y : HYP(Y )→ ω has a Π1,Y1 -graph, the Corollary to the
Spector-Gandy Theorem (cf. Corollary 41) implies that ∂Y : HYP(Y ) → ω is definable
in the structure (ω,HYP(Y ), 0, s,+,×,≤), and this establishes (ii)(a).
To establish (i)(a), note that since ∂Y : HYP(Y ) → ω is an injection, it follows that
MY = (ω,HYP(Y ), ∂Y ) is a model ABL0 (as in the proof of Proposition 26). To see that
it also models the Σ11-choice schema (18), suppose that MY |= ∀ z ∃ X ϕ(z,X, ∂Y (X)),
where ϕ is an arithmetical formula. (The proof for the case where z is replaced by a tuple
z, or where there are multiple existential set quantifiers and multiple existential relation
quantifiers, or where there are parameters from the model present in ϕ is exactly similar).
Then MY |= ∀ z ∃ X ∃ e [∂Y (X) = e ∧ ϕ(z,X, e)]. Define a relation Q(Y ⊕ {z}, X) as
follows:
Q(Y ⊕ {z}, X)⇐⇒ X ∈ HYP(Y ) & ∃ e [∂Y (X) = e ∧ ϕ(z,X, e)] (66)
Then Q is a Π11-predicate. By Kondo uniformization, there is a Π
1
1-uniformization Q
′ of
Q. For Y ∈ 2ω, define qY (z) = X if and only if Q′(Y ⊕ {z}, X) and let
RY = {(z, x) : ∃ X ∈ HYP(Y ) qY (z) = X ∧ x ∈ X} (67)
Then by Kleene’s Theorem on Restricted Quantification 37, RY is Π
1,Y
1 -definable. More-
over, since Q′ is a uniformization, we also have
RY = {(z, x) : ∀ X ∈ HYP(Y ) qY (z) = X → x ∈ X} (68)
Again, by Kleene’s Theorem on Restricted Quantification (37), the set RY is Σ
1,Y
1 -
definable. Hence RY is ∆
1,Y
1 and so RY ∈ HYP(Y ). Finally, since Q′ is a uniformization,
we have that MY |= ∀ z ϕ(z, (RY )z, ∂Y ((RY )z)), so in fact MY is a model of Σ11 − BL0 and
this establishes (i)(a).
To show (i)(b) and (ii)(b), we first prove (ii)(b) and then note how our proof of (ii)(b)
in fact establishes (i)(b). Recall that by Proposition 27, there is an injective function
sY : ω → ω whose graph is in HYP(Y ) such that sY (n) = ∂Y ({n}) for all n ∈ ω. Define
an sY -recursive function fY : ω → ω:
fY (0) = ∂Y (∅) & fY (n+ 1) = sY (fY (n)) (69)
Let NY be the range of fY , so that both the graph of fY and its range NY are in HYP(Y ).
Since NY = rng(fY ) and dom(fY ) = ω, the following induction principle holds:
∀ P [fY (0) ∈ P & ∀ n ∈ ω fY (n) ∈ P → fY (n+ 1) ∈ P ]→ NY ⊆ P (70)
Using this form of induction, one can show that fY : ω → NY is injective, so that its
inverse f−1Y : NY → ω exists and is likewise in HYP(Y ). Further, one can arithmetically
define from NY , fY and f
−1
Y the functions ⊕Y : N2Y → NY and ⊗Y : N2Y → NY as follows:
fY (x)⊕Y fY (y) = fY (f−1Y (x) + f−1Y (y)) fY (x)⊗Y fY (y) = fY (f−1Y (x) · f−1Y (y)) (71)
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and then arithmetically define a relation  on N2Y by
x Y y ⇐⇒ ∃ z ∈ NY x⊕Y z = y (72)
Further one can extend the map to fY : HYP(Y )→ (P (NY ) ∩ HYP(Y )) by setting
fY (X) = {fY (n) : n ∈ X} (73)
and define the following structure in the signature of (ω, 0, s,+,×,≤,HYP(Y )):
HY = (NY , ∂Y (∅), sY ,⊕Y ,⊗Y ,Y , fY (HYP(Y ))) (74)
Then the functions fY and fY witness that the two structures (ω, 0, s,+,×,≤,HYP(Y ))
and HY are isomorphic.
Further, note that HY is definable within MY : for, by the induction principle (70)
one can show that NY is the unique smallest set containing ∂Y (∅) and closed under sY ,
and using equation (71) and the induction principle (70) one can show that ⊕Y and ⊗Y
are the unique functions on NY satisfying the following recursion clauses
x⊕Y ∂Y (∅) = x x⊕Y (sY (z)) = sY (x⊕Y z) (75)
x⊗Y ∂Y (∅) = ∂Y (∅) x⊗Y (sY (z)) = (x⊗Y z)⊕Y x (76)
Hence, since HY and (ω,HYP(Y ), 0, s,+,×,≤) are isomorphic and since HY is definable
in MY , we have established (ii)(b). Finally, note by construction that the structure HY
witnesses that MY is a model of the axiom Inf, so that we have established (i)(b).
Corollary 54. Σ11 − AC0 ≤I Σ11 − LB0 + Inf <I Π11 − CA0.
Proof. Note that Σ11 − AC0 ≤I Σ11 − LB0 + Inf because the sentence Inf (cf. Definition 51)
literally provides an interpretation. To see that Σ11 − LB0 + Inf <I Π11 − CA0, note that
since the previous theorem can be proven in Π11 − CA0, it follows that Π11 − CA0 proves the
consistency of Σ11 − LB0 + Inf. Thus the result follows from Proposition 7.
4. Barwise-Schlipf Models of the Hyperarithmetic Subsystems of BL2 and HP2
In this section, we turn to building models of subsystems of BL2 and HP2 on top
of various recursively saturated fields. In particular, § 4.1 is devoted to the statement
and proof of a generalization of a theorem of Barwise-Schlipf and Ferreira-Wehmeier
(Theorem 63). Then in §§ 4.2-4.4 three applications of this theorem are presented. The
major result here is Corollary 92, which says that Σ11 − PH0 <I ACA0, and this fills in a key
piece of Figure 2 about the interpretability relation.
4.1. Generalization of the Barwise-Schlipf/Ferreira-Wehmeier Metatheorems
The main theorem of this section (Theorem 63) is a generalization of the way in which
Barwise-Schlipf ([2]) built models of ∆11 − CA0 on top of recursively saturated models of
Peano arithmetic, and the way in which Ferreira-Wehmeier ([13]) built models of ∆11 − BL0
on top of recursively saturated structures. The new addition is the concept of a uniformly
definable function ∂ : D(M)→M (Definition 55). Subsequent to defining this notion, the
definitions of definable skolem functions and recursively saturated structures are recalled,
and then Theorem 63 is stated and proven.
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Definition 55. Suppose that M is an L-structure and let D(Mn) be the definable subsets
of Mn. Then ∂ : D(M) → M is uniformly definable if for all L-formula θ(x, y) with all
free variables displayed and with a non-empty set y of parameter variables, there is an L-
formula θ′(x, y) with the same free variables, such that {∂(θ(·, a))} = {b : M |= θ′(b, a)}
for all a ∈M , i.e.:
a, b ∈M =⇒ [∂(θ(·, a)) = b⇐⇒M |= θ′(b, a)] (77)
Definition 56. Suppose that L is countable and that M is an L-structure and that
B ∈ 2ω. Then ∂ : D(M) → M is B-computably uniformly definable if it is uniformly
definable and the map θ 7→ θ′ is B-computable.
Definition 57. Suppose that M is an L-structure. Then M has definable skolem func-
tions if for every definable set P ⊆ Mm+n there is a definable set P ′ ⊆ Mm+n such
that
M |= ∀x, y [P ′xy → Pxy] (78)
M |= ∀ x [∃ y Pxy]→ [∃! y P ′xy] (79)
Remark 58. Note that in this definition, the parameters used to define P ′ may exceed
those used to define P . Note also the obvious similarity between definable skolem func-
tions and the uniformization results, such as Kondo’s Uniformization Theorem 42, which
we employed in Theorem 53. In particular, equations (78)-(79) are nearly identical to
equations (59)-(60).
Definition 59. Suppose that M is an L-structure and A ⊆M . A set of A-formulas p(v)
in finitely many variables v is realized in M if there is an b in M such that M |= θ(b) for
every A-formula θ(v) in p(v). A set of A-formulas p(v) is finitely realized in M if every
finite subset p0(v) of p(v) is realized in M . The structure M is saturated if for every
A ⊆M with |A| < |M | and every set of A-formulas p(v), if p(v) is finitely realized in M
then p(v) is realized in M .
Definition 60. Suppose that L and M are countable and B ∈ 2ω. Then M is B-
recursively saturated if for every finite A ⊆M and every B-computable set of A-formulas
p(v), if p(v) is finitely realized in M then p(v) is realized in M .
Remark 61. The following proposition records the very elementary observation that sat-
urated structures (resp. B-recursively saturated structures) have a kind of compactness
property, in that each covering of Mn by definable sets has a finite sub-covering (resp.
each B-recursive covering of Mn by definable sets has a finite sub-covering).
Proposition 62. Suppose that M is a saturated L-structure (resp. B-recursively satu-
rated L-structure) and that A ⊆ M with |A| < |M |. Further, suppose that {θi(v)}i∈I is
a set of A-formulas (resp. B-computable set of A-formulas). Then
[M |= ∀ a
∨
i∈I
θi(v)] =⇒ [∃ finite I0 ⊆ I M |= ∀ a
∨
i∈I0
θi(v)] (80)
Proof. The contrapositive of equation (80) says that if the set of A-formulas p(v) =
{¬θi(a) : i ∈ I} is finitely realized, then it is realized.
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Theorem 63. Suppose that M is an L-structure and ∂ : D(M) → M such that the
structure N = (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . , ∂) models ABL0 (resp. AHP0). Suppose that B ∈
2ω. Then
(i) If ∂ : D(M)→M is uniformly definable and M is saturated, then the structure N
models ∆11 − BL0 (resp. ∆11 − HP0).
(ii) If ∂ : D(M)→M is uniformly definable and M is saturated, then the structure N
models Σ11 − LB0 (resp. Σ11 − PH0) if and only if M has definable skolem functions.
(iii) If ∂ : D(M) → M is B-computably uniformly definable and M is B-recursively
saturated, then the structure N models ∆11 − BL0 (resp. ∆11 − HP0).
(iv) If ∂ : D(M) → M is B-computably uniformly definable and M is B-recursively
saturated, then the structure N models Σ11 − LB0 (resp. Σ11 − PH0) if and only if M
has definable skolem functions.
Proof. In all four parts of this proof, the proof is identical between Basic Law V and
Hume’s Principle, and so we only include the proofs for the case of Basic Law V. Further,
the proof of (i) and (iii) are parallel and the proof of (ii) and (iv) are parallel, and so
we present the proofs of (i) and (iii) simultaneously and the proofs of (ii) and (iv) simul-
taneously. For (i) and (iii), suppose that ∂ : D(M) → M is uniformly definable (resp.
B-computably uniformly definable) and M is saturated (resp. B-recursively saturated).
To see that N is a model of ∆11 − BL0, suppose that there is a subset Z of Mn which is
defined on N by a Σ11-formula ϕ(z) and by a Π
1
1-formula ψ(z). Let us suppose that ϕ(z)
and ψ(z) use exactly one set parameter A ∈ D(M) where
A = {w ∈M : M |= ρ(w, a)} (81)
and where ρ(w, v) is an ∅-formula with a ∈ M , since the proof in the case where there
are multiple parameters, with some being objects, some sets, and some binary relations
etc., is exactly identical. Further, let us suppose that ϕ(z) ≡ ∃ X ϕ0(z,X, ∂(X), A) and
that ψ(z) ≡ ∀ X ψ0(z,X, ∂(X), A), since the proof in the case where there are multiple
existential (resp. universal) set-quantifiers or relation-quantifiers in ϕ(z) (resp. ψ(z)) is
exactly identical. Then
z ∈ Z ⇐⇒ N |= ∃ X ϕ0(z,X, ∂(X), A)⇐⇒ N |= ∀ X ψ0(z,X, ∂(X), A) (82)
Then
N |= ∀ z ∃ X ϕ0(z,X, ∂(X), A) ∨ ¬ψ0(z,X, ∂(X), A) (83)
Let us abbreviate
ξ0(z,X, ∂(X), A) ≡ ϕ0(z,X, ∂(X), A) ∨ ¬ψ0(z,X, ∂(X), A) (84)
so that equation (83) becomes
N |= ∀ z ∃ X ξ0(z,X, ∂(X), A) (85)
Then this translates into M as
M |= ∀ z
∨
θ(x,y)
∃ b ξ0(z, θ(·, b), ∂(θ(·, b)), ρ(·, a)) (86)
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where θ(x, y) ranges over ∅-formulas with non-empty set of parameter variables y. Since
the map ∂ : D(M)→M is uniformly definable (resp. B-computably uniformly definable)
via the map θ 7→ θ′, we have
M |= ∀ z
∨
θ(x,y)
∃ b ∃ c (θ′(c, b) & ξ0(z, θ(·, b), c, ρ(·, a)) (87)
Since M is saturated (resp. B-recursively saturated), an application of Proposition 62
implies that there is K > 0 and there are ∅-formulas θ1(x, y), . . . , θK(x, y) such that
M |= ∀ z
K∨
i=1
∃ b ∃ c (θ′i(c, b) & ξ0(z, θi(·, b), c, ρ(·, a))) (88)
Then by definition of ξ0 (cf. equation 84)), we have:
M |= ∀ z
K∨
i=1
∃ b ∃ c (θ′i(c, b) & (ϕ0(z, θi(·, b), c, ρ(·, a)) ∨ ¬ψ0(z, θi(·, b), c, ρ(·, a)))) (89)
It follows from equation (82) that
Z = {z ∈Mn : M |=
K∨
i=1
∃ b ∃ c (θ′i(c, b) & (ϕ0(z, θi(·, b), c, ρ(·, a)))} (90)
Hence Z ∈ D(Mn) and so N satisfies ∆11 − BL0. Hence, this completes the proof of parts (i)
and (iii).
We turn to the proofs of parts (ii) and (iv). First, we handle the proof of the right-
to-left direction, which is quite similar to the proof from the above paragraph. Suppose
that ∂ : D(M) → M is uniformly definable (resp. B-computably uniformly definable)
and M is saturated (resp. B-recursively saturated) and has definable skolem functions.
To see that N is a model of Σ11 − LB0, suppose that
N |= ∀ z ∃ X ξ0(z,X, ∂(X), A) (91)
where ξ0 is arithmetical and where A ∈ D(M) is a set parameter with
A = {w ∈M : M |= ρ(w, a)} (92)
and where ρ(w, v) is an ∅-formula with a ∈M . (As in the proof in the previous paragraph,
the case of multiple parameters or multiple set or relation quantifiers is exactly similar).
Then equation (91) translates into M as
M |= ∀ z
∨
θ(x,y)
∃ b ξ0(z, θ(·, b), ∂(θ(·, b)), ρ(·, a)) (93)
where θ(x, y) ranges over ∅-formulas with non-empty set of parameter variables y. Since
∂ : D(M)→M is uniformly definable (resp. B-computably uniformly definable) via the
map θ 7→ θ′, we have
M |= ∀ z
∨
θ(x,y)
∃ b ∃ c (θ′(c, b) & ξ0(z, θ(·, b), c, ρ(·, a)) (94)
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Since M is saturated (resp. B-recursively saturated), an application of Proposition 62
implies that there is K > 0 and there are ∅-formulas θ1(x, y), . . . , θK(x, y) such that
M |= ∀ z
K∨
i=1
∃ b ∃ c (θ′i(c, b) & ξ0(z, θi(·, b), c, ρ(·, a))) (95)
Then by adding dummy variables if need be, we can move the disjunction to the right as
follows:
M |= ∀ z ∃ b ∃ c
K∨
i=1
(θ′i(c, b) & ξ0(z, θi(·, b), c, ρ(·, a))) (96)
and one can take the first such i as follows:
M |= ∀ z ∃ b ∃ c
K∨
i=1
[(θ′i(c, b) & ξ0(z, θi(·, b), c, ρ(·, a))) &
∧
j<i
¬(θ′j(c, b) & ξ0(z, θj(·, b), c, ρ(·, a)))]
(97)
Then since M has definable skolem functions, there is a possibly larger finite set of
parameters a′ ⊇ a and a′-definable functions f, g such that
M |= ∀ z
K∨
i=1
[(θ′i(g(z), f(z)) & ξ0(z, θi(·, f(z)), g(z), ρ(·, a)))
&
∧
j<i
¬(θ′j(g(z), f(z)) & ξ0(z, θj(·, f(z)), g(z), ρ(·, a)))] (98)
Then there is a partition of Mn into the a′-definable sets P1, . . . , PK which are defined as
follows:
Pi = {z ∈Mn : M |=[(θ′i(g(z), f(z)) & ξ0(z, θi(·, f(z)), g(z), ρ(·, a)))
&
∧
j<i
¬(θ′j(g(z), f(z)) & ξ0(z, θj(·, f(z)), g(z), ρ(·, a)))]} (99)
Then define the a′-definable relation
R = {(z, w) :
K∨
i=1
[z ∈ Pi → θi(w, f(z))]} (100)
so that
z ∈ Pi =⇒ Rz = {w ∈M : (z, w) ∈ R} = {w ∈M : M |= θi(w, f(z))} = θi(·, f(z))
(101)
z ∈ Pi =⇒ {∂(Rz)} = {∂(θi(·, f(z))} = {c ∈M : M |= θ′i(c, f(z))} = {g(z)} (102)
z ∈ Pi =⇒ ∂(Rz) = g(z) (103)
Putting these things together and glancing back at the definition of Pi in equation (99)
we have,
z ∈ Pi =⇒M |= (θ′i(g(z), f(z)) & ξ0(z, θi(·, f(z)), g(z), ρ(·, a))) =⇒ N |= ξ0(z,Rz, ∂(Rz), A)
(104)
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Since the sets P1, . . . , PK partition M
n we have
N |= ∀ z ξ0(z, Rz, ∂(Rz), A) (105)
and this implies that N models Σ11 − BL0. Hence we have established the right-to-left
direction of (ii) and (iv).
We want to establish the left-to-right direction of (ii) and (iv). Suppose that ∂ :
D(M) → M is uniformly definable (resp. B-computably uniformly definable) and M
is saturated (resp. B-recursively saturated) and that N models Σ11 − BL0. Suppose that
P ⊆Mm+n is definable, perhaps with a finite set a of parameters from M . Note that for
every x ∈ Mm with a tuple y ∈ Mn such that Pxy, we can arbitrarily choose one such
y ∈Mn and form the y-definable singleton {y}. This implies that
N |= ∀ x ∃ R [(∃ y Pxy)→ ((∃! y Ry) & (∀ y Ry → Pxy))] (106)
Since N |= Σ11 − LB0, one then has
N |= ∃ P ′ ∀ x [(∃ y Pxy)→ ((∃! y P ′xy) & (∀ y P ′xy → Pxy))] (107)
Since P ′xy if and only if P
′xy, this implies that
N |= ∃ P ′ ∀ x [(∃ y Pxy)→ ((∃! y P ′xy) & (∀ y P ′xy → Pxy))] (108)
Finally, let P ′′ = P ′ ∩ P . Then
M |= ∀x, y (P ′′xy → Pxy) (109)
M |= ∀ x [(∃ y Pxy)→ (∃! y P ′′xy)] (110)
Hence, M has definable skolem functions.
4.2. Application to Algebraically Closed Fields
Remark 64. In this section, we apply Theorem 63 to construct models of ∆11 − HP0 on top
of certain algebraically closed fields (cf. Theorem 70). The primary application of this
construction is to answer a question posed by Linnebo (cf. Remark 74 and Theorem 76).
Prior to doing this, we recall Ax’s Theorem and note one elementary consequence of this
theorem.
Theorem 65. (Ax’s Theorem) Suppose that k is an algebraically closed field and f :
k → k is a definable injective function. Then f is surjective.
Proof. See Ax [1] Theorem C pp. 241, 270 or Poizat [32] Lemma 4.3 pp. 70-71, in which
is proved the stronger result wherein k is replaced by a definable subset of kn.
Definition 66. A structure k is strongly minimal if every definable X ⊆ k is finite or
cofinite.
Proposition 67. Every algebraically closed field is strongly minimal.
Proof. See Marker [27] p. 5.
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Proposition 68. Suppose that k is an algebraically closed field and that X, Y ⊆ k are
definable. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) There is definable bijection f : X → Y
(ii) Either both X and Y are finite and of the same cardinality, or both X and Y are
cofinite and k \X and k \ Y are of the same cardinality.
Proof. Suppose that (i) holds. Then by strong minimality and the fact that an infinite
set cannot be bijective with a finite set, either both X and Y are finite or both X and Y
are cofinite. If X and Y are both finite then the fact that there is a definable bijection
between them implies that X and Y have the same cardinality. If X and Y are both
cofinite but k\X and k\Y are not of the same cardinality, then without loss of generality
k \ X = {a1, . . . , am} and k \ Y = {b1, . . . , bn} where m < n. Then define a function
f : k → k by f  X = f and f(ai) = bi for i ≤ m. Then f : k → k is an injection that is
not a surjection, since bn is not the in the range of f . This contradicts Ax’s Theorem 65.
So, in fact, k \X and k \ Y are of the same cardinality. Then (ii) holds.
Conversely, suppose that (ii) holds. If both X and Y are finite of the same cardinality,
then simply enumerate the elements of X and Y and use these elements as parameters to
define a bijection f : X → Y . If X and Y are both cofinite and k \X and k \Y are of the
same finite cardinality, then enumerate k \ X = {y1, . . . , yn} and k \ Y = {x1, . . . , xn}.
By renumbering, we can assume without loss of generality that (k \ X) ∩ (k \ Y ) =
{x1, . . . , xm} = {y1, . . . , ym} where m ≤ n and x1 = y1, . . . , xm = ym. If m = n then this
implies that (k \ X) = (k \ Y ) and X = Y , and we can choose the definable bijection
f : X → Y to be the identity map. If m < n, then note that {xm+1, . . . , xn} ⊆ X and
{ym+1, . . . , yn} ⊆ Y and X \ {xm+1, . . . , xn} ⊆ Y and Y \ {ym+1, . . . , yn} ⊆ X. Then
we can choose the definable bijection f : X → Y which is given by the identity on
X \ {xm+1, . . . , xn} and by f(xi) = yi on {xm+1, . . . , xn}.
Proposition 69. Algebraically closed fields do not have definable skolem functions.
Proof. Let ϕ(x, y) ≡ x = y2. Then k |= ∀ x ∃ y x = y2. If k has definable skolem
functions, then there is a definable function f : k → k such that k |= ∀ x x = (f(x))2.
Then rng(f) is a definable set which includes exactly one square root for each x ∈ k.
Then rng(f) is infinite and coinfinite, which contradicts strong minimality.
Theorem 70. Suppose that k is a saturated algebraically closed field of character-
istic zero. Then there is a uniformly definable function # : D(k) → k such that
(k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) is a model of ∆11 − HP0 +¬Σ11 − PH0 +¬Π11 − HP0. Further, there is
no function ∂ : D(k)→ k such that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . , ∂) is a model of ∆11 − BL0.
Proof. Since k is a field of characteristic zero, the prime field of k is Q and the integers
Z are hence embedded into k via Q. Using this embedding, define # : D(k) → k by
#X = |X| if X is finite and #X = −(|k \X| + 1) if X is cofinite. Then by Proposi-
tion 68, the structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) is a model of Hume’s Principle. To apply
Theorem 63 (i)-(ii), we need to show that # : D(k)→ k is uniformly definable. Suppose
that θ(x, y) is an ∅-formula with non-empty set y of parameter variables. Then by strong
minimality, for any a we have that θ(·, a) is finite or ¬θ(·, a) is finite. Then
k |= ∀ a
∨
N≥0
[|θ(·, a)| ≤ N ∨ |¬θ(·, a)| ≤ N ] (111)
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Since k is saturated, by Proposition 62, there is an integer Nθ > 0 such that
k |= ∀ a
Nθ∨
i=0
[|θ(·, a)| ≤ i ∨ |¬θ(·, a)| ≤ i] (112)
Then for each such formula θ(x, y) we define the following ∅-formula θ′(x, y) as follows:
θ′(x, y) ≡
Nθ∨
i=0
[|θ(·, y)| = i & x = i] ∨ [|¬θ(·, y)| = i & x = −(i+ 1)] (113)
Hence, by definition, we have that for any a
{#(θ(·, a))} = {c : k |= θ′(c, a)} (114)
The map # : D(k)→ k is uniformly definable. Hence, by Theorem 63 (i)-(ii) and Proposi-
tion 69, we have that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) is a model of ∆11 − HP0+¬Σ11 − PH0. Further,
since the set rng(#) = Z is definable by a Σ11-formula in the structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#)
but is not definable in k since k is strongly minimal, we have that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#)
is a model of ¬Π11 − HP0.
Now let us note why there is no function ∂ : D(k)→ k such that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . , ∂)
is a model of ∆11 − BL0. If there was such a function, then by Corollary 31 it would follow
that there was an injective non-surjective function s : k → k whose graph is in D(k2),
which would contradict Ax’s Theorem (65).
Remark 71. If we knew that all the parts of the proof of the above theorem were formal-
izable in ACA0, then we could infer from the proof of the above theorem and Proposition 7
that ∆11 − HP0 <I ACA0. It is clear from the proof that this comes down to determining
whether or not Ax’s Theorem 65 is provable in ACA0. However, note that in the next
subsection, we will prove Corollary 92, which assures us that ∆11 − HP0 <I ACA0.
Remark 72. In conjunction with Corollary 31, the following corollary shows that there
is a stark contrast between ∆11 − HP0 and ∆11 − BL0 on the score of whether they require
the existence of injective non-surjective functions.
Corollary 73. There is a model (M,S1, S2, . . . ,#) of ∆
1
1 − HP0 such that there is no
injective non-surjective function s : M →M such that graph(s) is in S2.
Proof. This follows immediately from the construction in Theorem 70 and Ax’s Theo-
rem 65.
Remark 74. Linnebo presented a description of properties that models of AHP0 and
∆11 − HP0 must have if they fail to model a certain sort of successor axiom ([24] pp. 164-
165), and he additionally showed that there was a model of AHP0 which did not model this
successor axiom ([24] Theorem 2 p. 164). Linnebo then remarked that it was unknown
whether there was a model of ∆11 − HP0 that did not model the successor axiom (cf. [24]
Remark 6 p. 168). Subsequent to defining this successor axiom, we now show that the
model from the previous theorem does not model this axiom. We also explain why certain
properties identified by Linnebo hold in this model.
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Definition 75. The following are formulas in the language of HP2 (cf. Linnebo [24]
pp. 158-160):
(i) P (n,m)⇐⇒ ∃ X, Y #X = n & #Y = m & ∃ y ∈ Y X = Y \ {y}
(ii) F is hereditary if Fn and P (n,m) implies Fm
(iii) F is closed if P (#∅,m) implies Fm
(iv) n is a pseudo-number if n = #∅ or n is contained in all hereditary, closed F .
(v) The successor axiom (SA) says that for any pseudo-number n, there is m such that
P (n,m).
Proposition 76. Suppose that k is a saturated algebraically closed field of characteristic
zero. Suppose that # : D(k)→ k by #X = |X| if X is finite and #X = −(|k \X| + 1)
if X is cofinite. Then (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) |= ∆11 − HP0 + ¬SA.
Proof. Before we begin, it is perhaps helpful to informally state the definition of # given
above and describe how it interacts with the predicate P (n,m). If X is a finite set with
n elements, then #X = n, and if X is a cofinite set with n elements in its complement,
then #X = −(n + 1). So, for example, the set X = {√2,−1} has #X = 2, and the
set X = {a ∈ k : k |= a2 + 1 6= 0} has #X = −(2 + 1) = −3, and the set X = k has
#X = −1, and the set X = ∅ has #X = 0. Further, if X is finite, then by choosing
an element y /∈ X, we have P (#X,#(X ∪ {y})). For example, if X is finite and has n
elements and y /∈ X, we have that #X = n and #(X ∪{y}) = n+ 1, so that P (n, n+ 1).
Conversely, if X is cofinite and has n > 0 elements in its complement and y /∈ X, then we
have that X∪{y} has n−1 elements in its complement, so that #X = −(n+1) = −n−1
and #(X ∪{y}) = −((n− 1) + 1) = −n and hence P (−n− 1,−n). For example, we have
P (0, 1), P (1, 2), P (2, 3), . . . and . . . , P (−4,−3), P (−3,−2), P (−2,−1).
Now we begin the proof. In particular, we want to begin by describing what the
hereditary, closed sets F ∈ D(k) look like. So suppose that F ∈ D(k) is hereditary
and closed. First we claim that N \ {0} ⊆ F . For, by the definition of P (n,m) and #,
we have that F ’s being closed implies that P (0, 1) and hence 1 ∈ F . So suppose that
n ∈ (N \ {0}) ∩ F . Then by the definition of P (n,m) and #, we have that F ’s being
hereditary implies that P (n, n + 1) and hence n + 1 ∈ F . By induction, we have that if
F ∈ D(k) is hereditary and closed then N \ {0} ⊆ F .
We want to claim that {n ∈ Z : n 6= 0} ⊆ F . Suppose not. That is, suppose that
there are some negative integers that are not in F . Then, since F ∈ D(k) is infinite,
strong minimality implies that F is co-finite. So there are at most finitely many negative
integers that are not in F . Suppose that we write these negative integers in increasing
order as a1 < a2 < · · · < an. (E.g. if Z \ F = {−5,−10,−12} then a1 = −12, a2 = −10
and a3 = −5). This implies that a1−1 ∈ F . But then by the definition of P (n,m) and #,
we have that F ’s being hereditary implies that P (a1 − 1, a1) and hence Fa1, which is a
contradiction. Hence, in fact we have that {n ∈ Z : n 6= 0} ⊆ F . So, what we have shown
in this paragraph is that if F ∈ D(k) is hereditary and closed, then {n ∈ Z : n 6= 0} ⊆ F .
This, of course, implies that every element of Z is a pseduo-number. Conversely, it is
not difficult to see that all the pseudo-numbers are elements of Z. Suppose that a ∈ k
is not an integer. Then the set F = k \ {a} is a hereditary closed set that does not
contain a. Hence, what we have shown in this paragraph is that the pseduo-numbers in
the structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) are precisely the integers.
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Now we are in a position to show that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) |= ¬SA. For, consider
the set k ∈ D(k). By definition #k = −(|k \ k| + 1) = −1. Hence, by the results of the
previous paragraph, we have that #k is a pseudo-number. So suppose that SA held on the
structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#). Then there would be m such that P (#k,m). Then by
definition, there would be sets X, Y ∈ D(k) such that #k = #X and m = #Y and ∃ y ∈
Y X = Y \ {y}. Since Hume’s Principle holds on the structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#),
we have that #k = #X implies that there is a bijection f : X → Y that is definable in the
structure k. By Proposition 68, we have that k \ k and k \X are of the same cardinality,
so that X = k. But then the condition that y ∈ Y \X implies that y ∈ k \ k, which is a
contradiction. So, in fact, SA does not hold on the structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#).
Remark 77. In the course of his proof of the existence of a model of AHP0+¬SA, Linnebo
noted several properties which must be had by such models (cf. [24] pp. 164-165). Since
models of ∆11 − HP0 + ¬SA are automatically models of AHP0 + ¬SA, Linnebo’s results
predict several properties of the model from the previous proposition. In this remark,
we briefly explain why the properties identified by Linnebo hold on this structure. First,
Linnebo notes that the example of a pseduo-number n witnessing that SA fails on the
structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) must be such that n = #k. In the last paragraph of
the previous proposition, we showed that n = #k was such a counterexample. Second,
Linnebo notes that the example of a structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) |= ¬SA must be
such that k \ X 6= ∅ implies #k 6= #X. In the context of the model constructed in
the previous proposition, this is a consequence of Ax’s Theorem (or Proposition 68).
Finally, Linnebo notes that the example of a structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) |= ¬SA
must contain a copy of both ω and ω∗ ordered by the P -relation, that is, this structure
must contain a copy of the positive integers and the negative integers ordered by the
P -relation. In the model constructed in the previous theorem, this is reflected in the fact
that the pseduo-numbers are precisely the integers.
4.3. Application to O-Minimal Expansions of Real-Closed Fields
Remark 78. In this section, we apply Theorem 63 to construct models of Σ11 − PH0 on
top of certain o-minimal expansions of real-closed fields (cf. Theorem 90), and an effec-
tivization of this construction allows us to conclude that Σ11 − PH0 <I ACA0 (cf. Corol-
lary 92), thus filling in a key piece of the interpretability relation (cf. Figure 2). Prior
to doing this, we recall some basic notions pertaining to the model theory of o-minimal
expansions of real-closed fields, such as dimension and Euler characteristic; the reader
who is already familiar with these notions may wish to proceed directly to Theorem 90.
Definition 79. Suppose that L is a signature extending the signature of linear orders,
and suppose that M is an L-structure such that (M,≤) is a dense linear order. Then M
is o-minimal if every definable set is a finite union of points and intervals.
Proposition 80. Every real-closed ordered field is o-minimal.
Proof. See Marker [27] Corollary 2.5 p. 11.
Definition 81. Suppose that M is an o-minimal structure. If X is a definable subset
of Mn, then let C(X) be the set of definable continuous functions f : X → M , and let
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C∞(X) be C(X) plus the two constant functions −∞,∞. Further, if f, g ∈ C∞(X) and
f < g on X, then let
(f, g)X = {(x, r) ∈ X ×R : f(x) < r < g(x)} (115)
Then inductively define the notion of a σ-cell, where σ ∈ 2<ω is a finite sequence of
zeros and ones. First, 0-cells are points and 1-cells are open intervals, including (−∞, a),
(a,∞). Second, given a σ-cell X, the σ0-cells are graphs of functions f ∈ C(X), and the
σ1-cells are sets (f, g)X where f, g ∈ C∞(X).
Definition 82. Suppose that M is an o-minimal structure. A decomposition of Mn is
defined inductively as follows. A decomposition of M1 is a finite partition of M with the
following form:
{(−∞, a1), (a1, a2), . . . , (ak,+∞), {a1}, . . . , {ak}} (116)
where a1 < a2 < · · · < ak. A decomposition of Mm+1 = Mm ×M is a finite partition
of Mm+1 into cells {A1, . . . , An} such that the set of projections {pi(A1), . . . , pi(An)} is
a decomposition of Mm, where pi : Mm+1 → Mm by pi(x1, . . . , xm+1) = (x1, . . . , xm). A
decomposition of Mm is said to partition a definable set X ⊆Mm if X can be written as
a finite union of cells in the decomposition.
Theorem 83. (Cell Decomposition Theorem) Suppose that M is an o-minimal structure.
For any finite sequence of B-definable sets A1, . . . , Ak ⊆Mm, there is a decomposition of
Mm partitioning each of the Ai. Moreover, the cells in the decomposition are B-definable.
Proof. See van den Dries [39] Theorem 2.11 p. 52.
Definition 84. Suppose that M is an o-minimal structure and that X ⊆ Mn. Then
define
dim(X) = max{i1 + · · ·+ in : X contains a (i1, . . . , in)-cell} (117)
E(X) = k0 − k1 + k2 − · · · =
n∑
d=0
kd(−1)d (118)
where kd is the number of d-dimensional cells contained in some cell decomposition of X.
Remark 85. Note that if X ⊆ M , then dim(X) > 0 if and only if X contains an
open interval. Note that the above definition of Euler dimension can be shown to be
independent of the choice of the cell decomposition (cf. [39] Proposition 2.2 p. 70).
Proposition 86. Suppose that M is an o-minimal structure and that θ(x, y) is a ∅-
formula. Then there is a positive integer Nθ > 0 such that for all b ∈ M , it is the case
that ∣∣dim(θ(·, b)∣∣ , ∣∣E(θ(·, b))∣∣ < Nθ (119)
Further, for each integer k, it is the case that the sets
{b ∈M : dim(θ(·, b)) = k} & {b ∈M : E(θ(·, b)) = k} (120)
are ∅-definable. Moreover, the formulas that define these sets and the positive integer Nθ
can be uniformly computed from θ.
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Proof. See van den Dries [39] Proposition 1.5 p. 65 and Proposition 2.10 p. 72.
Proposition 87. Suppose that M is an o-minimal expansion of a real-closed field, and
suppose that X ⊆Mn and Y ⊆Mm are definable sets. Then there is a definable bijection
f : X → Y if and only if dim(X) = dim(Y ) and E(X) = E(Y ).
Proof. See van den Dries [39] p. 132.
Remark 88. As a simple illustration of this fact, consider the example of the two sets
X = (−2,−1) unionsq {0} unionsq (1, 2) Y = (−1, 1) (121)
Both have dimension 1, since they both contain intervals, and their Euler characteristics
are the same, namely, E(X) = 1 − 2 = −1 and E(Y ) = 0 − 1 = −1. Hence, the above
proposition predicts that there is a definable bijection f : X → Y , and in fact this is the
case: one simply sends (−2,−1) to (−1, 0) and one sends 0 to 0 and one sends (1, 2) to
(0, 1).
Proposition 89. O-minimal expansions of real closed fields have definable skolem func-
tions.
Proof. See van den Dries [39] p. 94.
Theorem 90. Suppose that k is a recursively-saturated o-minimal expansion of a real-
closed field. Then there is a computably uniformly definable function # : D(k) → k
such that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) is a model of Σ11 − PH0 + ¬Π11 − HP0. Further, there is
no function ∂ : D(k)→ k such that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . , ∂) is a model of ∆11 − BL0.
Proof. Since k is a field of characteristic zero, the prime field of k is Q and the integers Z
are hence embedded into k via Q. Choose a recursive bijection 〈·, ·〉 : Z2 → Z. Using this
embedding and this bijection, define # : D(k)→ k by #X = 〈dim(X), E(X)〉. Then by
Proposition 87, the structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) is a model of Hume’s Principle. To
apply Theorem 63 (iii)-(iv), we need to show that # : D(k)→ k is computably uniformly
definable. So suppose that θ(x, y) is an ∅-formula with non-empty set y of parameter
variables. Then by Proposition 86, from the formula θ(x, y) we can uniformly compute a
positive integer Nθ > 0 such that
k |= ∀ b [∣∣dim(θ(·, b)∣∣ , ∣∣E(θ(·, b))∣∣ < Nθ] (122)
as well as ∅-formulas defining the sets {b : dim(θ(·, b) = n} and {b : E(θ(·, b)) = n}. Then
for each such formula θ(x, y) we define the following ∅-formula θ′(x, y) as follows:
θ′(x, y) ≡
Nθ∨
i=0
Nθ∨
j=0
[dim(θ(·, y)) = i & E(θ(·, y)) = j]→ x = 〈i, j〉 (123)
Hence, by definition, we have that for any a
{#(θ(·, a))} = {c : k |= θ′(c, a)} (124)
Hence, by Theorem 63 (iii)-(iv) and Proposition 89, we have that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#)
is a model of Σ11 − PH0. Further, since the set rng(#) = Z is definable by a Σ11-formula
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in the structure (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) but is not definable in k since k is o-minimal, we
have that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . ,#) is a model of ¬Π11 − HP0.
Now let us note why there is no function ∂ : D(k)→ k such that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . , ∂)
is a model of ∆11 − BL0. If there was such a function, then by Proposition 27, there would
be a function s : k2 → k whose graph was in D(k2) and which satisfied s(x, y) = ∂({x, y}).
Consider the definable set X = {(x, y) ∈ k2 : x < y}, and note that dim(X) = 2. Then
s  X : X → k is an injection. For, suppose s(x, y) = s(x′, y′) for (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ X. Then
∂({x, y}) = ∂({x′, y′}) and x < y and x′ < y′. Then by Basic Law V, {x, y} = {x′, y′}
and x < y and x′ < y′. Then x = x′ and y = y′. Hence, in fact, s  X : X → k is an
injection. Then trivially s  X : X → rng(s  X) is a bijection whose graph is in D(k2).
Then by the left-to-right direction of Proposition 87, it would follow that
2 = dim(X) = dim(rng(s  X)) ≤ dim(k) = 1 (125)
which is a contradiction.
Remark 91. It is our claim that all of the results quoted and proved in this subsection can
be proven in ACA0 for o-minimal structures M with ACA0-provable quantifier-elimination,
such as real-closed fields (cf. Marker [27] Theorem 2.3 p. 10, Simpson [35] Lemma II.9.6
p. 98). The reason for this is that (i) the proofs from van den Dries [39] all concern
properties of definable sets, as opposed to properties of the defining formula, and (ii) the
proofs from van den Dries [39] all proceed by induction on the cartesian power of the
definable set. It is worthwhile to say a little bit more about each of these points.
In regard to (i), the proofs in this section from van den Dries [39] are all concerned with
properties of a definable set X, so that the definable set X has the property regardless of
which particular formula is used to define X. For instance, the property of X’s being a cell
has this feature, since a definable set X ⊆ M is e.g. an interval or a point regardless of
whether the formula ϕ or the formula ψ is being used to define it (where ϕ and ψ are two
formulas that do in fact define X). By the same token, the proofs in this section from
van den Dries [39] are not concerned with the syntactic complexity of given formulas, for
instance, whether or not they are Π03-formulas or Π
0
4-formulas. Hence, if M has quantifier-
elimination, then for the purposes of the proofs in this section from van den Dries [39],
we can take the quantifier-free formulas as representatives for the definable sets. For
instance, in proving the Cell Decomposition Theorem in this manner, we would in fact
prove that e.g. for every finite sequence of quantifier-free formulas ϕ1(x), . . . , ϕk(x) in
m-free variables, there is a quantifier-free decomposition of Mm partitioning each of the
ϕi(x).
In regard to (ii), the proofs in this section from van den Dries [39] all proceed by
induction, where it is first shown that the definable subsets of M have a given property,
and then it is shown that if the definable subsets of Mn have a given property, then
the definable subsets of Mn+1 have this given property. Given our discussion in the
previous paragraph, when proving these theorems in ACA0, we would in fact prove that the
quantifier-free formulas ϕ(x) have a given property, and that if the quantifier-free formulas
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) have a given property, then the quantifier-free formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn+1)
have a given property. Since ACA0 has the mathematical induction axiom for all sets X, it
suffices to note that ACA0 has enough comprehension to show that the sets X on which it is
doing induction exist. Here it suffices to note that the proofs in this section from van den
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Dries [39] all concern properties of the definable sets that can be expressed by (iii) finitely
many quantifiers over quantifier-free definable sets and by (iv) finitely many quantifiers
over the structure M . For instance, to reiterate the point made in the last paragraph, in
proving the Cell Decomposition Theorem in this fashion, we must show that for every m
and every finite sequence of quantifier-free formulas ϕ1(x), . . . , ϕk(x) in m-free variables,
there is a quantifier-free decomposition of Mm partitioning each of the ϕi(x). In terms
of (iii), this involves a universal quantifier over quantifier-free definable sets followed by
an existential quantifier over quantifier-free definable sets. In terms of (iv), this involves a
universal quantifier to say that e.g. the cells in the decomposition are disjoint and another
universal quantifier to say that e.g. ϕi(x) can be written as a finite union of pairwise
disjoint cells in the decomposition. Since the number of quantifiers in (iii) and (iv) is
fixed in advance, ACA0 can prove that the set on which one is doing induction exists. In
this way, the proofs from van den Dries [39] can be translated word-for-word into proofs
in ACA0 for o-minimal structures M which have ACA0-provable quantifier-elimination, such
as real-closed fields.
Corollary 92. Σ11 − PH0 <I ACA0.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 7, the fact that ACA0 proves the existence of recur-
sively saturated elementary extensions (cf. Simpson [35] Lemma IX.4.2 pp. 379), and the
fact that the proof of the previous theorem can be formalized in ACA0 for o-minimal ex-
pansions of real-closed fields with ACA0-provable quantifier-elimination, such as real-closed
fields.
4.4. Application to Separably Closed Fields of Finite Imperfection Degree
Remark 93. In the two previous subsections, we applied Theorem 63 to construct models
of ∆11 − HP0 on top of various fields, such as certain algebraically closed fields and o-
minimal expansions of real-closed fields. We noted in both Theorem 70 and Theorem 90
that this construction cannot result in models of ∆11 − BL0. Hence, this raises the question
of whether there is some natural field such that one can apply Theorem 63 to it to
obtain models of ∆11 − BL0. In this section, we isolate certain model-theoretic conditions
on a field (such a uniform elimination of imaginaries) which suffice to ensure that such a
construction can succeed (cf. Theorem 99). Then we note that separably closed fields of
finite imperfection degree satisfy these model-theoretic conditions (cf. Theorem 101).
Definition 94. Suppose that M is an L-structure. Then M has uniform elimination of
imaginaries if for every ∅-definable equivalence relation E on Mn there is an ∅-definable
function f : Mn →Mm for some m > 0 such that
zEy ⇐⇒ f(z) = f(y) (126)
Definition 95. Suppose that M is an L-structure. Then M has a ∅-definable pairing
function if there is an ∅-definable injection ι : M2 →M .
Proposition 96. Suppose that M has uniform elimination of imaginaries and an ∅-
definable pairing function. Then for every ∅-definable equivalence relation E on Mn
there is an ∅-definable function f : Mn →M such that
zEy ⇐⇒ f(z) = f(y) (127)
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Proof. By hypothesis, M has an ∅-definable pairing function ι : M2 → M . Then define
injections jn : M
n →M recursively as follows:
j1(x1) = x1 (128)
j2(x1, x2) = ι(x1, x2) (129)
jn+1(x1, . . . xn, xn+1) = ι(jn(x1, . . . , xn), xn+1) (130)
Finally, given a function f : Mn → Mm for some m > 0 which witnesses the uniform
elimination of imaginaries, simply define f ∗ = jm ◦ f .
Proposition 97. Suppose that M has an ∅-definable pairing function and that dcl(∅)
has at least two elements. Then there is a uniformly computable sequence of injections
ιn : M →M such that n 6= m implies rng(ιn) ∩ rng(ιm) = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that ι : M2 → M is the ∅-definable injection and that b, c ∈ dcl(∅) are
distinct. Then define injections ιn : M →M recursively as follows:
ι0(x) = ι(c, ι(c, x)) (131)
ι2s+1(x) = ι(b, ι2s(x)) (132)
ι2s+2(x) = ι(c, ι2s+1(x)) (133)
By construction, all the functions ιn : M → M are injections. So it remains to show by
induction on m ≤ n that rng(ιn)∩ rng(ιm) = ∅ when m 6= n. Clearly this holds for n = 0.
So suppose it holds for n. If n is even then n = 2s and n+ 1 = 2s+ 1. Suppose that m <
n+ 1 is such that rng(ιn+1)∩ rng(ιm) 6= ∅. Then there are x, y such that ιn+1(x) = ιm(y).
Expanding this equation on the left, we have ι(b, ι2s(x)) = ι2s+1(x) = ιn+1(x) = ιm(y).
Then by construction, ιm(y) = ι(b, ι2t(y)) for some 2t+ 1 = m. Then ιm−1(y) = ι2t(y) =
ι2s(x) = ιn(x), which contradicts our induction hypothesis on n. On the other hand, if
n is odd then n = 2s + 1 and n + 1 = 2s + 2. Suppose that m < n + 1 is such that
rng(ιn+1)∩ rng(ιm) 6= ∅. Then there are x, y such that ιn+1(x) = ιm(y). Then expanding
this equation on the left we have ι(c, ι2s+1(x)) = ι2s+2(x) = ιn+1(x) = ιm(y). There are
then two cases. First suppose that m = 0. Then by construction ιm(y) = ι(c, ι(c, y)).
Then ι(b, ι2s(x)) = ι2s+1(x) = ι(c, y), and so b = c, which is a contradiction. Second,
suppose that m > 0. Then by construction, ιm(y) = ι(c, ι2t+1(y)) for some 2t + 2 = m.
Then ιm−1(y) = ι2t+1(y) = ι2s+1(x) = ιn(x), contradicting our induction hypothesis on
n.
Remark 98. Prior to proving the following theorem, let us here attempt to sketch the
intuitive proof idea. Suppose that M has uniform elimination of imaginaries and a ∅-
definable pairing function. Then given a formula θ(x, y) with a set of parameter variables
y of length ` > 0, these assumptions yield an ∅-definable function ∂θ : M ` → M such
that
M |= [∀ x θ(x, a)↔ θ(x, b)]⇐⇒ ∂θ(a) = ∂θ(b) (134)
Intuitively, the idea is to build a model (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . , ∂) of Basic Law V by
setting
∂(θ(·, a)) = ∂θ(a) (135)
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However, there are two potential problems. First, such a function will not be well-defined,
since a given set X ∈ D(M) will be defined by many formulas θ1(·, a), θ2(·, b), . . .. Second,
it is not obvious that such a function will be injective, which is required by Basic Law V.
Overcoming these problems is the only thing that makes the below proof non-trivial. In
particular, the first problem is overcome simply by fixing beforehand an enumeration
of the all potential defining formulas θ1(x, y), . . . , θn(x, y), . . ., and then defining ∂(X)
to be ∂θn(a) for the first θn(x, a) in the enumeration that defines X for some tuple a.
The second problem is overcome by including additional hypotheses on M which ensure
that we can partition M =
⊔
nMn and likewise ensure that ∂θn(a) always takes values
in Mn. The previous proposition was in effect devoted to explaining why the hypothesis
of a ∅-definable pairing function with |dcl(∅)| > 1 ensure that we can construct such a
partition.
Theorem 99. Suppose that M is a Th(M)-computably saturated structure such that
(i) M has uniform elimination of imaginaries, (ii) M has an ∅-definable pairing function,
and (iii) dcl(∅) has at least two elements. Then there is a Th(M)-computably uniformly
definable function ∂ : D(M) → M such that (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . , ∂) is a model of
∆11 − BL0.
Proof. To apply Theorem 63 (iii)-(iv), we need to define an injection ∂ : D(M) → M
that is Th(M)-computably uniformly definable. Choose a fixed computable enumeration
of the ∅-formulas θ(x, y) with non-empty set y of parameter variables of length `n as
θ1(x, y), . . . , θn(x, y), . . .. For each n > 0 and 0 < m ≤ n, consider the following ∅-
definable sets Un,m ⊆M `n , where again `n is the length of the tuple y in θn(x, y):
U1,1 = M
`1 (136)
U2,1 = {a ∈M `2 : ∃ b ∈M `1 [∀ x θ2(x, a)↔ θ1(x, b)]} (137)
U2,2 = M
`2 \ U2,1 (138)
U3,1 = {a ∈M `3 : ∃ b ∈M `1 [∀ x θ3(x, a)↔ θ1(x, b)]} (139)
U3,2 = {a ∈M `3 : ∃ b ∈M `2 [∀ x θ3(x, a)↔ θ2(x, b)]} \ U3,1 (140)
U3,3 = M
`3 \ (U3,1 ∪ U3,2) (141)
Note that for a fixed n > 0 that the sets Un,1, . . . , Un,n partition M
`n and that the formulas
defining these sets are uniformly computable from n. Then define ∅-definable equivalence
relations on M `n as follows:
yEnz ⇐⇒M |= [∀ x θn(x, y)↔ θn(x, z)] (142)
Note by definition that any two elements y and z which are En-equivalent are in the same
member of the partition Un,1, . . . , Un,n of M
`n . By Proposition 96 from θn(x, y) we can
uniformly Th(M)-compute a ∅-definable function fn : M `n →M such that
M |= [∀ x θn(x, y)↔ θn(x, z)]⇐⇒ yEnz ⇐⇒ fn(y) = fn(z) (143)
By Proposition 97, we can uniformly compute a sequence of injections ιn : M →M with
disjoint ranges, and we can define gn = ιn ◦ fn. Finally, define ∂ : D(M)→M by
∂(θn(·, a)) = c⇐⇒
n∧
m=1
[a ∈ Un,m → (∃ b ∈M `m & ∀ x θn(x, a)↔ θm(x, b) & c = gm(b))]
(144)
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First let us show that ∂ : D(M) → M is a well-defined function. So suppose that
θn(·, a) and c satisfy the right-hand side of equation (144) and that θn′(·, a′) and c′ also
satisfy the right-hand side of equation (144), and suppose that θn(·, a) and θn′(·, a′) define
the same set. Then we must show that c = c′. Without loss of generality, n′ ≤ n. If
n′ = n, then since θn(·, a) and θn′(·, a′) define the same set, we have that a and a′
are En-equivalent and hence are in the same set Un,m. Then by the right-hand side of
equation (144), we have that there are b, b
′ ∈M `m such that
M |= ∀ x θm(x, b)↔ θn(x, a)↔ θn(x, a′)↔ θm(x, b′) (145)
c = gm(b) (146)
c′ = gm(b
′
) (147)
But by equation (145), we have that b and b
′
are Em-equivalent, and hence by equa-
tion (143), we have that fm(b) = fm(b
′
) and so by equations (146)-(147) we have that
c = gm(b) = ιm ◦ fm(b) = ιm ◦ fm(b′) = gm(b′) = c′ (148)
In the case where n′ < n, we have that a ∈ Un,m and a′ ∈ Un′,m′ and so by the right-hand
side of equation (144), we have that there is b ∈M `m , b′ ∈M `m′ such that
M |= ∀ x θm(x, b)↔ θn(x, a)↔ θn(x, a′)↔ θm′(x, b′) (149)
c = gm(b) (150)
c′ = gm′(b
′
) (151)
Then by equation (149) and the definition of the sets Un,m, we must have that m = m
′.
Then by equation (149) again, we have that b and b
′
are Em-equivalent, and, hence, by
equation (143), we have that fm(b) = fm(b
′
), and so by equations (150)-(151) we have
that
c = gm(b) = ιm ◦ fm(b) = ιm ◦ fm(b′) = gm(b′) = c′ (152)
Therefore, ∂ : D(M)→M is a well-defined function.
Now let us show that ∂ : D(M) → M is an injection. Suppose that θn(·, a) and c
satisfy the right-hand side of equation (144) and that θn′(·, a′) and c′ satisfy the right-
hand side of equation (144) and suppose that c = c′. Then we must show that θn(·, a)
and θn′(·, a′) define the same set. We have that a ∈ Un,m and a′ ∈ Un′,m′ , and by the
right-hand side of equation (144), we have that there is b ∈M `m , b′ ∈M `m′ such that
M |= ∀ x θn(x, a)↔ θm(x, b) (153)
M |= ∀ x θn′(x, a′)↔ θm′(x, b′) (154)
gm(b) = c = c
′ = gm′(b
′
) (155)
Since gm = ιm ◦ fm and since the functions ιm have distinct ranges, equation (155)
implies that m = m′ and since gm = ιm ◦ fm and ιm is an injection, we have that
equation (155) implies that fm(b) = fm′(b
′
), which by equation (143) implies that θm(·, b)
and θm′(·, b′) define the same set. This in turn implies with equations (153)-(154) that
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θn(·, a) and θn′(·, a′) define the same set, which is what we wanted to show. Hence, in
fact ∂ : D(M)→M is an injection.
So, ∂ : D(M)→M is well-defined and indeed an injection. Note that by its very def-
inition in equation (144), we have that ∂ : D(M)→M is Th(M)-computably uniformly
definable. Hence, by Theorem 63 (iii)-(iv), we have that (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . , ∂) is a
model of ∆11 − BL0.
Definition 100. Suppose that k is field of characteristic p > 0. Then k is a separably
closed field of finite imperfection degree if (i) there is a finite set B ⊆ k such that the set
of monomials {bm11 · · · bmee : 0 ≤ mi < p & b1, . . . , be ∈ B} is a basis for k over kp, and
if (ii) every f ∈ k[x] such that f ′ 6= 0 has a root in k.
Theorem 101. Suppose that k is a recursively saturated separably closed field of finite
imperfection degree. Then there is a computably uniformly definable function ∂ : D(k)→
k such that (k,D(k), D(k2), . . . , ∂) is a model of ∆11 − BL0.
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that such fields satisfy the antecedents
of the previous theorem and have a computable theory when names are added for the
finite set B from the previous definition (cf. Messmer [28] Proposition 4.2 p. 140, p. 143,
Remark 4.4 p. 141).
Remark 102. If we knew that all the elements of the proof of the previous theorem
were formalizable in ACA0, then we could infer from the proof of the above theorem and
Proposition 7 that we have ∆11 − BL0 <I ACA0. It is clear from the proof that this comes
down to determining whether or not the uniform elimination of imaginaries for separably
closed fields of finite imperfection degree is provable in ACA0.
5. Further Questions
Question 103. In Figure 1, we summarized what is known about the provability relation.
Two questions which remain open are the following: does ∆11 − BL0 imply Σ11 − LB0 and
does Π11 − HP0 imply Σ11 − PH0?
Question 104. In Remark 71, we noted that if Ax’s Theorem 65 is provable in ACA0, then
we would have another proof of ∆11 − HP0 <I ACA0 besides the proof from Corollary 92.
Hence, is Ax’s Theorem 65 provable in ACA0?
Question 105. In Remark 102, we noted that if the uniform elimination of imaginaries
for separably closed fields is provable in ACA0, then we would have ∆
1
1 − BL0 <I ACA0.
Hence, is the uniform elimination of imaginaries for separably closed fields provable in
ACA0?
Question 106. The results in Heck [19], Ganea [16], and Visser [40] imply that ABL0
is mutually interpretable with Robinson’s Q. Is ∆11 − BL0 mutually interpretable with
Robinson’s Q?
Question 107. What is the exact interpretability strength of AHP0 and ∆
1
1 − HP0? Are
these theories interpretable in Robinson’s Q?
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Question 108. In § 2.2, and in particular around equation (20), we pointed out that
there is no function symbol in our language for the mapping (R, n) 7→ #(Rn), where
R is a binary relation and Rn = {m : Rnm}. The inclusion of such a function symbol
will not affect systems which contain the ∆11-comprehension schema, since the graph of
this function is ∆11-definable (cf. equation (20)). However, in Propositions 48-49, we
pointed that AHP0 and ABL0 do not prove the existence of the graph of this function
(R, n) 7→ #(Rn), in the sense that AHP0 and ABL0 do not prove that the binary relation
{(n,m) : #(Rn) = m} exists for every binary relation R. Does the addition of this
function symbol affect the interpretability strength of AHP0 and ABL0? In particular, do
the Heck-Visser-Ganea results about the mutual interpretability of ABL0 and Robinson’s
Q mentioned in § 1.5 still hold if we add a function symbol for (R, n) 7→ #(Rn)?
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